行业协会、游说和内生制度

IF 3 1区 社会学 Q1 LAW Journal of Legal Analysis Pub Date : 2015-12-01 DOI:10.1093/JLA/LAV009
Maria Larrain, J. Prüfer
{"title":"行业协会、游说和内生制度","authors":"Maria Larrain, J. Prüfer","doi":"10.1093/JLA/LAV009","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A trade association is a millennium-old organizational form that has existed on all continents. It is a private, formal, nonprofit organization designed to promote the common interests of its members, even if these members are competitors on product (or research) markets. While it is straightforward to assume that an association creates net benefits for its members – why would they join, otherwise? – it is unclear whether, or under which circumstances, the existence of an association has positive net effects for the rest of the economy. In “Trade Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions,” Maria Larrain and Jens Prufer study this question by means of a game-theoretic model. The answer is, of course, “it depends.” But on what does it depend? And why?","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":"399 1","pages":"467-516"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"10","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Trade Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions\",\"authors\":\"Maria Larrain, J. Prüfer\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/JLA/LAV009\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A trade association is a millennium-old organizational form that has existed on all continents. It is a private, formal, nonprofit organization designed to promote the common interests of its members, even if these members are competitors on product (or research) markets. While it is straightforward to assume that an association creates net benefits for its members – why would they join, otherwise? – it is unclear whether, or under which circumstances, the existence of an association has positive net effects for the rest of the economy. In “Trade Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions,” Maria Larrain and Jens Prufer study this question by means of a game-theoretic model. The answer is, of course, “it depends.” But on what does it depend? And why?\",\"PeriodicalId\":45189,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Legal Analysis\",\"volume\":\"399 1\",\"pages\":\"467-516\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"10\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Legal Analysis\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLA/LAV009\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Legal Analysis","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLA/LAV009","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10

摘要

行业协会是一种有上千年历史的组织形式,存在于各大洲。它是一个私人的、正式的、非营利性的组织,旨在促进其成员的共同利益,即使这些成员是产品(或研究)市场上的竞争对手。虽然一个协会为其成员创造净利益是很简单的假设,但他们为什么要加入呢?——目前尚不清楚一种关联的存在是否或在何种情况下会对经济的其他部分产生积极的净影响。在《行业协会、游说和内生制度》一书中,Maria Larrain和Jens Prufer通过博弈论模型研究了这个问题。答案当然是“视情况而定”。但是它取决于什么呢?,为什么?
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Trade Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions
A trade association is a millennium-old organizational form that has existed on all continents. It is a private, formal, nonprofit organization designed to promote the common interests of its members, even if these members are competitors on product (or research) markets. While it is straightforward to assume that an association creates net benefits for its members – why would they join, otherwise? – it is unclear whether, or under which circumstances, the existence of an association has positive net effects for the rest of the economy. In “Trade Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions,” Maria Larrain and Jens Prufer study this question by means of a game-theoretic model. The answer is, of course, “it depends.” But on what does it depend? And why?
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
3
审稿时长
16 weeks
期刊最新文献
The Limits of Formalism in the Separation of Powers Putting Freedom of Contract in its Place Large Legal Fictions: Profiling Legal Hallucinations in Large Language Models How Election Rules Affect Who Wins Remote Work and City Decline: Lessons From the Garment District
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1