Jamaica: The Limits of a Showcase Policy

V.iOLENT protests rocked Jamaica for two days in January 1985 and shattered a four-year period of relative tranquility, evoking grim memories of the Dominican Republic uprising in April of the preceding year. The Kingston demonstrations, sparked by an increase of twenty-one percent in fuel prices, resulted in the death of at least seven people and the injury of twenty others, leading many observers to question the effectiveness of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Jamaica.1 That policy can only be analyzed in the broader context of U.S. policy in the Caribbean and Central America. The Reagan administration, in an attempt to halt perceived Soviet and Cuban influence in a region considered vital to U.S. national interests, has pursued an activist policy. President Reagan emphasized the strategic importance of the region three years ago: "Nearly half of our trade, two-thirds of our imported oil, and [more than] half of our imported strategic minerals pass through the Panama Canal or the Gulf of Mexico."2 The activist policy seeks to achieve U.S. political and strategic objectives through increased levels of economic and technical assistance.