M,.ore than thirty years ago Paul H. Nitze published an influential essay, "Atoms, Strategy, and Policy," in Foreign Affairs, which offered a penetrating critique of the Eisenhower-Dulles nuclear strategy of massive retaliation.1 Most significant, however, was the conceptual distinction he drew between declaratory policy and action policy. Nitze defined declaratory policy as "policy statements which have as their aim political and psychological effects." Action policy was described as the "general guidelines which we believe should and will in fact govern our actions in various contingencies."2 Nitze argued that whereas the Eisenhower administration's declaratory policy rested on massive retaliation, its action policy actually set in motion the doctrine of gradual deterrence. This sharp disjunction troubled Nitze because he believed that the psychological and political effectiveness of declaratory policy would be vitiated if it departed too greatly from action policy.3
米,。30多年前，保罗·h·尼采(Paul H. Nitze)在《外交事务》(Foreign Affairs)上发表了一篇颇具影响力的文章《原子、战略与政策》(Atoms, Strategy, and Policy)，对艾森豪威尔-杜勒斯(Eisenhower-Dulles)大规模报复的核战略进行了深刻批判然而，最重要的是他在声明性政策和行动性政策之间所作的概念区分。尼采将声明性政策定义为“以政治和心理效应为目的的政策声明”。行动政策被描述为“我们认为在各种突发事件中应该并且将会实际指导我们行动的一般指导方针”。尼采认为，艾森豪威尔政府的宣示政策以大规模报复为基础，而其行动政策实际上启动了逐步威慑的原则。这种尖锐的脱节困扰着尼采，因为他认为，如果宣言性政策与行动性政策偏离太大，它的心理和政治效果就会受到损害
{"title":"Action History, Declaratory History, and the Reagan Years","authors":"Richard A. Melanson","doi":"10.1353/SAIS.1989.0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/SAIS.1989.0026","url":null,"abstract":"M,.ore than thirty years ago Paul H. Nitze published an influential essay, \"Atoms, Strategy, and Policy,\" in Foreign Affairs, which offered a penetrating critique of the Eisenhower-Dulles nuclear strategy of massive retaliation.1 Most significant, however, was the conceptual distinction he drew between declaratory policy and action policy. Nitze defined declaratory policy as \"policy statements which have as their aim political and psychological effects.\" Action policy was described as the \"general guidelines which we believe should and will in fact govern our actions in various contingencies.\"2 Nitze argued that whereas the Eisenhower administration's declaratory policy rested on massive retaliation, its action policy actually set in motion the doctrine of gradual deterrence. This sharp disjunction troubled Nitze because he believed that the psychological and political effectiveness of declaratory policy would be vitiated if it departed too greatly from action policy.3","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"33 1","pages":"225 - 246"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74082358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Whriting in this journal two decades ago, J. David Singer outlined the promise of a "scientific" approach to international relations theory.1 It was a rare time of conscious methodological and epistemological reflection within the discipline, and Singer was an influential proponent of the "behavioral revolution" then in evidence throughout political science. Singer's target was the work of "classical" or "traditional" scholars such as Hans Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers, Raymond Aron, and George Liska — the founders of modern international relations theory itself. His complaint was neither with the topics these theorists chose to analyze, nor with the conclusions they drew, but with the methodologies they relied upon. As Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau summarized in 1967, in the battle then underway between science and tradition, "it is the mode of analysis, not its subject matter, that is the central issue."2 Behavioral scientists like Singer argued that the mode of classical analysis was inherently flawed because it could provide no assurance of objectivity. Traditional international relations theory, though insightful
20年前，j·大卫·辛格(J. David Singer)在这本杂志上概述了用“科学”方法研究国际关系理论的前景这是该学科中少有的有意识的方法论和认识论反思的时期，辛格是“行为革命”的有影响力的支持者，当时在整个政治学中随处可见。辛格的目标是“古典”或“传统”学者的作品，如汉斯·摩根索、阿诺德·沃尔弗斯、雷蒙德·阿隆和乔治·里斯卡——现代国际关系理论本身的创始人。他的抱怨既不是针对这些理论家选择分析的主题，也不是针对他们得出的结论，而是针对他们所依赖的方法。正如克劳斯·诺尔(Klaus Knorr)和詹姆斯·罗森瑙(James Rosenau)在1967年总结的那样，在当时正在进行的科学与传统之间的斗争中，“核心问题是分析的模式，而不是分析的主题。”像辛格这样的行为科学家认为，经典分析模式在本质上是有缺陷的，因为它不能保证客观性。传统的国际关系理论虽然很有见地
{"title":"The Use and Abuse of Social Science for Policy","authors":"David Dessler","doi":"10.1353/SAIS.1989.0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/SAIS.1989.0020","url":null,"abstract":"Whriting in this journal two decades ago, J. David Singer outlined the promise of a \"scientific\" approach to international relations theory.1 It was a rare time of conscious methodological and epistemological reflection within the discipline, and Singer was an influential proponent of the \"behavioral revolution\" then in evidence throughout political science. Singer's target was the work of \"classical\" or \"traditional\" scholars such as Hans Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers, Raymond Aron, and George Liska — the founders of modern international relations theory itself. His complaint was neither with the topics these theorists chose to analyze, nor with the conclusions they drew, but with the methodologies they relied upon. As Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau summarized in 1967, in the battle then underway between science and tradition, \"it is the mode of analysis, not its subject matter, that is the central issue.\"2 Behavioral scientists like Singer argued that the mode of classical analysis was inherently flawed because it could provide no assurance of objectivity. Traditional international relations theory, though insightful","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"15 1","pages":"203 - 223"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74691358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
HE RECENT TALK OF A REAGAN DOCTRINE in support of anti-Soviet "democratic revolution" must be examined in the light of enduring principles and past manifestations of the underlying impulse before it can be applied meaningfully to an analysis of U.S.-Soviet relations. Insofar as it is a dynamic version oftraditional containment, it recallsJohn Foster Dulles's strategy of rollback-cum-liberation. Only this time the net is cast out wider: the theater is no longer limited to Eastern Europe but encompasses the Third World at large. The means, too, have been enlarged, from propaganda only in the 1950s, to propaganda plus military assistance and "humanitarian aid" in the 1980s. At the same time the ambition has dwindled: regaining Angola for democracy does not rate liberating Poland from communism. Neither is Central America worth East-central Europe, when the criterion is the balance of world power and the impulse is more than parochial preoccupation with one's backyard. With attention focused on Central America, we are back in the strategic universe of the Monroe Doctrine. Although U.S. power has grown well beyond dependence on the Royal Navy for implementing it, a diminution is again in evidence: the globally imperial America, which fought Hanoi's regional imperialism in Southeast Asia, has shrunk to something resembling the regionally imperialistic United States of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The analogy of Vietnam has been invoked by both the opponents of the current policy and its supporters. The former see the Central American policy as fraught with the threat of military involvement, the George Liska is professor of political science at TheJohns Hopkins University. This is the third in a series of articles on U.S.-Soviet relations for the SAIS
{"title":"The Reagan Doctrine: Monroe and Dulles Reincarnate?","authors":"G. Liška","doi":"10.1353/SAIS.1986.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/SAIS.1986.0012","url":null,"abstract":"HE RECENT TALK OF A REAGAN DOCTRINE in support of anti-Soviet \"democratic revolution\" must be examined in the light of enduring principles and past manifestations of the underlying impulse before it can be applied meaningfully to an analysis of U.S.-Soviet relations. Insofar as it is a dynamic version oftraditional containment, it recallsJohn Foster Dulles's strategy of rollback-cum-liberation. Only this time the net is cast out wider: the theater is no longer limited to Eastern Europe but encompasses the Third World at large. The means, too, have been enlarged, from propaganda only in the 1950s, to propaganda plus military assistance and \"humanitarian aid\" in the 1980s. At the same time the ambition has dwindled: regaining Angola for democracy does not rate liberating Poland from communism. Neither is Central America worth East-central Europe, when the criterion is the balance of world power and the impulse is more than parochial preoccupation with one's backyard. With attention focused on Central America, we are back in the strategic universe of the Monroe Doctrine. Although U.S. power has grown well beyond dependence on the Royal Navy for implementing it, a diminution is again in evidence: the globally imperial America, which fought Hanoi's regional imperialism in Southeast Asia, has shrunk to something resembling the regionally imperialistic United States of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The analogy of Vietnam has been invoked by both the opponents of the current policy and its supporters. The former see the Central American policy as fraught with the threat of military involvement, the George Liska is professor of political science at TheJohns Hopkins University. This is the third in a series of articles on U.S.-Soviet relations for the SAIS","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"1 1","pages":"83 - 98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72958781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Nineteen-Nineties as History","authors":"V. Mastny","doi":"10.1353/SAIS.1990.0027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/SAIS.1990.0027","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"81 1","pages":"1 - 13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73185708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Great Powers and Little Wars: The Limits of Power (review)","authors":"J. Shapiro","doi":"10.1353/sais.1994.0041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.1994.0041","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"4 1","pages":"176 - 178"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75503340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition? (review)","authors":"M. Vlahos","doi":"10.1353/SAIS.1985.0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/SAIS.1985.0021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"68 1","pages":"257 - 258"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75528815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"NAFTA: An Assessment (review)","authors":"Kai Mander","doi":"10.1353/SAIS.1993.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/SAIS.1993.0017","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"360 1","pages":"152 - 154"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73987776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
redictably, the Reagan Doctrine led the administration into a political and moral morass. Far more than a set of specific policy prescriptions, the Reagan Doctrine provided the intellectual framework— the Weltanschauung— that shaped the administration's external policies. As events proved, the Reagan Doctrine was an unsuitable basis for a viable post-Vietnam foreign policy because it failed to mobilize sustained support for American engagement abroad; it could not be implemented without circumventing established constitutional and political norms, and it ignored the shifting balance of world forces that underscored the continuing erosion of the United States' postwar political and economic hegemony. Ronald Reagan's 1980 victory rested in large measure on his pledge to arrest the country's declining prestige and to conduct a tough-minded foreign policy backed by a restored consensus. Yet, when the Iran-Contra scandal broke — severely crippling Reagan's presidency two years before his term expired— friends and adversaries alike regarded the United States as not only weak but also hypocritical. The administration's grasp of world politics, in its own way, was as flawed as the Carter administration's. The Iran-Contra hearings highlighted the administration's failure to rebuild the postwar foreign policy consensus that Vietnam had shattered. What was the Reagan Doctrine? How did it compare with the policies of other postwar administrations? What was wrong with it? The answers
{"title":"Requiem for the Reagan Doctrine","authors":"C. Layne","doi":"10.1353/SAIS.1988.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/SAIS.1988.0014","url":null,"abstract":"redictably, the Reagan Doctrine led the administration into a political and moral morass. Far more than a set of specific policy prescriptions, the Reagan Doctrine provided the intellectual framework— the Weltanschauung— that shaped the administration's external policies. As events proved, the Reagan Doctrine was an unsuitable basis for a viable post-Vietnam foreign policy because it failed to mobilize sustained support for American engagement abroad; it could not be implemented without circumventing established constitutional and political norms, and it ignored the shifting balance of world forces that underscored the continuing erosion of the United States' postwar political and economic hegemony. Ronald Reagan's 1980 victory rested in large measure on his pledge to arrest the country's declining prestige and to conduct a tough-minded foreign policy backed by a restored consensus. Yet, when the Iran-Contra scandal broke — severely crippling Reagan's presidency two years before his term expired— friends and adversaries alike regarded the United States as not only weak but also hypocritical. The administration's grasp of world politics, in its own way, was as flawed as the Carter administration's. The Iran-Contra hearings highlighted the administration's failure to rebuild the postwar foreign policy consensus that Vietnam had shattered. What was the Reagan Doctrine? How did it compare with the policies of other postwar administrations? What was wrong with it? The answers","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"94 1","pages":"1 - 17"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78738896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
1.Hearings, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985, Wednesday, 28 March 1984, 17. 2.Secretary of State George P. Shultz, as quoted in the New York Times, 3 April 1984, A6. At about the same time, President Reagan said the Lebanon debate had set back U.S. attempts to help negotiate a political solution in Lebanon, and that calls for the withdrawal of our Marines had "hindered the ability of our diplomats to negotiate, encouraged more intransigence from the Syrians and prolonged the violence." New York Times, 8 April 1984, sec. 4, 1.
{"title":"Congress: Essential Ingredient in a Sound Foreign Policy","authors":"D. Bumpers","doi":"10.1353/SAIS.1985.0034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/SAIS.1985.0034","url":null,"abstract":"1.Hearings, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985, Wednesday, 28 March 1984, 17. 2.Secretary of State George P. Shultz, as quoted in the New York Times, 3 April 1984, A6. At about the same time, President Reagan said the Lebanon debate had set back U.S. attempts to help negotiate a political solution in Lebanon, and that calls for the withdrawal of our Marines had \"hindered the ability of our diplomats to negotiate, encouraged more intransigence from the Syrians and prolonged the violence.\" New York Times, 8 April 1984, sec. 4, 1.","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"1 1","pages":"51 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75957744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State (review)","authors":"L. Barrow","doi":"10.1353/sais.1988.0052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.1988.0052","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"7 1","pages":"288 - 289"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76018653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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