法治与战略在美国核主义中的作用

IF 4.8 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS International Security Pub Date : 2021-04-01 DOI:10.1162/isec_a_00407
Scott D. Sagan, Allen S. Weiner
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引用次数: 9

摘要

2013年,美国政府宣布其核战争计划将“符合武装冲突法的基本原则”,并将“适用区分和比例原则,并寻求最大限度地减少对平民人口和民用物体的附带损害”。如果应用得当,这些法律原则可以对美国的核理论产生深远的影响。禁止以平民为目标意味着“反价值”目标和“最低威慑”战略是非法的。区别原则和不允许对平民进行报复,使得美国故意以平民为目标是非法的,这与2018年《核态势评估报告》所暗示的相反,即使是为了报复对美国或盟国平民的打击。相称性原则允许美国对军事目标进行一些(但不是全部)潜在的反制核攻击。预防原则意味着美国必须使用常规武器或对合法军事目标有效的最低当量核武器。武装冲突法还将针对敌方领导层的目标限制在军事指挥系统中的官员或直接参与敌对行动的官员,这意味着以摧毁敌方整个政治领导层为广泛目标是非法的。
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The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine
Abstract In 2013, the U.S. government announced that its nuclear war plans would be “consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict” and would “apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects.” If properly applied, these legal principles can have a profound impact on U.S. nuclear doctrine. The prohibition against targeting civilians means that “countervalue” targeting and “minimum deterrence” strategies are illegal. The principle of distinction and the impermissibility of reprisal against civilians make it illegal for the United States, contrary to what is implied in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, to intentionally target civilians even in reprisal for a strike against U.S. or allied civilians. The principle of proportionality permits some, but not all, potential U.S. counterforce nuclear attacks against military targets. The precautionary principle means that the United States must use conventional weapons or the lowest-yield nuclear weapons that would be effective against legitimate military targets. The law of armed conflict also restricts targeting of an enemy's leadership to officials in the military chain of command or directly participating in hostilities, meaning that broad targeting to destroy an enemy's entire political leadership is unlawful.
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来源期刊
International Security
International Security Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
7.40
自引率
10.00%
发文量
13
期刊介绍: International Security publishes lucid, well-documented essays on the full range of contemporary security issues. Its articles address traditional topics of war and peace, as well as more recent dimensions of security, including environmental, demographic, and humanitarian issues, transnational networks, and emerging technologies. International Security has defined the debate on US national security policy and set the agenda for scholarship on international security affairs for more than forty years. The journal values scholarship that challenges the conventional wisdom, examines policy, engages theory, illuminates history, and discovers new trends. Readers of IS discover new developments in: The causes and prevention of war U.S.-China relations Great power politics Ethnic conflict and intra-state war Terrorism and insurgency Regional security in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America U.S. foreign and defense policy International relations theory Diplomatic and military history Cybersecurity and defense technology Political economy, business, and security Nuclear proliferation.
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