强制规则与默认规则:如何改进习惯国际法?

IF 5.2 1区 社会学 Q1 LAW Yale Law Journal Pub Date : 2011-03-07 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.1779782
C. Bradley, G. Gulati
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引用次数: 3

摘要

习惯国际法(CIL)在其来源、内容、可操作性和规范性吸引力方面存在不确定性。通过多边条约立法的兴起,也使民事司法的适当作用日益不确定。因此,这是一个思考如何振兴和改善CIL的时机。在之前的一篇文章中,我们认为,《国际贸易法》的“强制性观点”,即禁止各国单方面退出《国际贸易法》的规则,在功能上是有问题的,至少在全面适用于所有国际贸易法时是如此。我们还建议,可以通过允许类似于条约制度所允许的退出权来改进《公民权利公约》,其中许多条约制度允许国家单方面退出,至少在事先通知其退出意图之后。在《耶鲁法学杂志》网络版的一系列论文中,许多学者——Lea Brilmayer、William Dodge、David Luban、Carlos Vazquez和Isaias Tesfalidet——对我们提出的这种“默认观点”提出了异议。在这篇文章中,我们回应了他们的论点,同时也强调需要进一步考虑如何改进CIL。
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Mandatory Versus Default Rules: How Can Customary International Law Be Improved?
Customary International Law (CIL) is plagued with uncertainties about its sources, its content, its manipulability, and its normative attractiveness. The rise of law-making through multilateral treaties also makes the proper role of CIL increasingly uncertain. This is an opportune time, therefore, to be thinking of ways to revive and improve CIL. In a prior article, we argued that the "Mandatory View" of CIL, pursuant to which nations are barred from ever withdrawing unilaterally from rules of CIL, is functionally problematic, at least when applied across the board to all of CIL. We also suggested that CIL might be improved by allowing for exit rights similar to those allowed for under treaty regimes, many of which allow nations to withdraw unilaterally, at least after giving advance notice of their intent to do so. In a series of papers in Yale Law Journal’s online edition, a number of scholars - Lea Brilmayer, William Dodge, David Luban, Carlos Vazquez, and Isaias Tesfalidet - take issue with our proposal of such a "Default View" of CIL. In this essay, we respond to their arguments, while also emphasizing the need for additional consideration of the ways in which CIL might be improved.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.50
自引率
6.20%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Yale Law Journal Online is the online companion to The Yale Law Journal. It replaces The Pocket Part, which was the first such companion to be published by a leading law review. YLJ Online will continue The Pocket Part"s mission of augmenting the scholarship printed in The Yale Law Journal by providing original Essays, legal commentaries, responses to articles printed in the Journal, podcast and iTunes University recordings of various pieces, and other works by both established and emerging academics and practitioners.
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