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Dar Dar
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本政策概要概述了在限额与交易计划下分配温室气体排放配额的各种选择。津贴是一种重要的价值来源,可用于补偿受气候变化政策影响的公司或个人,或为其他社会期望的政策目标筹集资金。基本的分配决策包括是否自由分配排放配额,如果是,分配给谁,是否拍卖排放配额,如果是,如何分配收入。最近的一些“总量控制与排放交易”提案开始采用一种结合的方式,即免费提供部分配额,拍卖其余配额,拍卖配额的份额随着时间的推移而上升。如果选择自由分配,则必须确定分配的基础。选项包括根据历史排放(“祖父设定”)、根据产出或投入水平、或根据环境绩效“基准”发放配额;每一种都对谁从配额价值中受益有影响。如果进行配额拍卖,除了决定如何使用拍卖产生的收入外,政策制定者还需要确定拍卖的类型和频率。许多相同的目标可以通过拍卖收入或自由分配来实现,包括为受影响的公司和消费者提供过渡,以及支持新技术。然而,分配决策有时需要在实现经济影响的公平分配、确保政治可行性和最小化总体计划成本的竞争目标之间进行权衡。配额分配既是一个挑战,也是一个机遇:没有一个分配公式能让所有人都满意,但分配决策可以以有利于向低碳经济过渡的方式做出,并提高对气候变化采取有意义行动的可能性。国会政策简报
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This policy brief outlines various options for distributing greenhouse gas emission allowances under a cap-and-trade program. Allowances represent a significant source of value and can be used to compensate firms or individuals affected by climate change policy or to raise funds for other socially desirable policy objectives. The basic allocation decision involves whether to freely allocate emission allowances, and if so, to whom, and whether to auction allowances, and if so, how to distribute the revenues. A number of recent cap-and-trade proposals begin with a combined approach that provides some allowances for free and auctions the rest, with the share of auctioned allowances rising over time. If free allocation is chosen, the basis for distribution must be determined. Options include granting allowances based on historical emissions (“grandfathering”), on levels of an output or input, or on an environmental performance “benchmark;” each has implications in terms of who benefits from the value of the allowances. If allowances are auctioned, in addition to deciding how the revenue generated by the auction will be used, policymakers will need to determine the type and frequency of the auction. Many of the same objectives can be met using either auction revenues or free allocation, including easing transition for affected firms and consumers and supporting new technologies. However, allocation decisions will sometimes entail trade-offs among the competing goals of achieving an equitable distribution of economic impacts, ensuring political feasibility, and minimizing overall program cost. Allowance allocation presents both a challenge and an opportunity: no allocation formula will satisfy everyone, yet allocation decisions can be made in ways that ease the transition to a low-carbon economy and enhance the likelihood of meaningful action on climate change. Congressional Policy Brief
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