神经网络的隐形感染——一种低成本的敏捷神经木马攻击方法

Tao Liu, Wujie Wen, Yier Jin
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引用次数: 32

摘要

深度神经网络(DNN)最近已经成为推动人工智能(AI)行业的“事实上的”技术。然而,随着基于深度神经网络的智能系统的日益普及,也出现了许多安全问题。现有的DNN安全研究,如对抗性攻击、投毒攻击等,通常都是狭隘地在软件算法层面进行,错误分类是其主要目标。新兴智能服务供应链引入的更现实的系统级攻击,例如基于第三方云的机器学习即服务(MLaaS)以及便携式DNN计算引擎,从未被讨论过。在这项工作中,我们提出了一种低成本的模块化方法-神经网络隐身感染,即“SIN2”,以展示新颖实用的智能供应链触发神经木马攻击。我们的“SIN2”很好地利用了基于静态神经网络模型和底层神经计算框架动态运行系统的攻击机会,通过一堆神经木马技术。我们按照提出的“SIN2”在Linux沙箱中实现了各种神经木马攻击。实验结果表明,我们的模块化设计可以快速生成并触发各种特洛伊木马攻击,这些攻击可以很容易地逃避现有的防御。
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SIN2: Stealth infection on neural network — A low-cost agile neural Trojan attack methodology
Deep Neural Network (DNN) has recently become the “de facto” technique to drive the artificial intelligence (AI) industry. However, there also emerges many security issues as the DNN based intelligent systems are being increasingly prevalent. Existing DNN security studies, such as adversarial attacks and poisoning attacks, are usually narrowly conducted at the software algorithm level, with the misclassification as their primary goal. The more realistic system-level attacks introduced by the emerging intelligent service supply chain, e.g. the third-party cloud based machine learning as a service (MLaaS) along with the portable DNN computing engine, have never been discussed. In this work, we propose a low-cost modular methodology-Stealth Infection on Neural Network, namely “SIN2”, to demonstrate the novel and practical intelligent supply chain triggered neural Trojan attacks. Our “SIN2” well leverages the attacking opportunities built upon the static neural network model and the underlying dynamic runtime system of neural computing framework through a bunch of neural Trojaning techniques. We implement a variety of neural Trojan attacks in Linux sandbox by following proposed “SIN2”. Experimental results show that our modular design can rapidly produce and trigger various Trojan attacks that can easily evade the existing defenses.
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