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引用次数: 1
摘要
对惯犯实施更严厉惩罚的执法方案的普遍存在,继续挑战着寻求刑事司法政策经济解释的学者。本文正式提出了Dana, D.(2001)提出的解释。重新思考对惯犯加重惩罚的难题。耶鲁法学(Yale Law J. 110: 733-783),其依据是法律在教育人们了解不法行为方面的作用——即法律的所谓“表达功能”。分析表明,如果不知情的违法者在潜在违法者(与理性计算者相反)中所占比例足够大,那么对所有初犯施加宽松制裁、对重犯施加严厉制裁的逐步升级的结构代表了一种折衷解决方案(次优)。
Expressive Law and Escalating Penalties: Accounting for the Educational Function of Punishment
Abstract The pervasiveness of law enforcement schemes that prescribe harsher penalties for repeat offenders continues to challenge scholars who seek an economic explanation for criminal justice policies. The current paper formalizes an explanation suggested by Dana, D. (2001. Rethinking the puzzle of escalating penalties for repeat offenders. Yale Law J. 110: 733–783), which is based on the role of the law in educating people about wrongful behavior—the so-called “expressive function” of law. The analysis shows that an escalating structure that imposes a lenient sanction on all first-timers and a harsh sanction on repeaters represents a compromise solution that is (second best) optimal if the fraction of unknowing offenders in the population of potential offenders (as opposed to rational calculators) is sufficiently large.