{"title":"有二氧化碳上限的需求侧与供给侧气候政策","authors":"T. Eichner, Gilbert Kollenbach, M. Schopf","doi":"10.1093/ej/uead002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n In a Hotelling model with a climate coalition and a free-riding fringe, we compare demand-side and supply-side climate policies aimed at keeping CO2 concentration below a ceiling equivalent to global warming of 2○C. With the demand-side policy, the coalition caps its fuel demand. The corresponding allocation is intra-temporally distorted. With the supply-side policy, the coalition purchases deposits. The corresponding allocation is inter-temporally distorted and the fuel extraction path can be discontinuous. In an empirically calibrated economy, a medium-sized [the grand] coalition is stable with the demand[supply]-side policy If the coalition acts strategically, the stable grand coalition implements first best.","PeriodicalId":85686,"journal":{"name":"The Economic journal of Nepal","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Demand- Versus Supply-Side Climate Policies with a Carbon Dioxide Ceiling\",\"authors\":\"T. Eichner, Gilbert Kollenbach, M. Schopf\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/ej/uead002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n In a Hotelling model with a climate coalition and a free-riding fringe, we compare demand-side and supply-side climate policies aimed at keeping CO2 concentration below a ceiling equivalent to global warming of 2○C. With the demand-side policy, the coalition caps its fuel demand. The corresponding allocation is intra-temporally distorted. With the supply-side policy, the coalition purchases deposits. The corresponding allocation is inter-temporally distorted and the fuel extraction path can be discontinuous. In an empirically calibrated economy, a medium-sized [the grand] coalition is stable with the demand[supply]-side policy If the coalition acts strategically, the stable grand coalition implements first best.\",\"PeriodicalId\":85686,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Economic journal of Nepal\",\"volume\":\"34 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-01-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Economic journal of Nepal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead002\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Economic journal of Nepal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Demand- Versus Supply-Side Climate Policies with a Carbon Dioxide Ceiling
In a Hotelling model with a climate coalition and a free-riding fringe, we compare demand-side and supply-side climate policies aimed at keeping CO2 concentration below a ceiling equivalent to global warming of 2○C. With the demand-side policy, the coalition caps its fuel demand. The corresponding allocation is intra-temporally distorted. With the supply-side policy, the coalition purchases deposits. The corresponding allocation is inter-temporally distorted and the fuel extraction path can be discontinuous. In an empirically calibrated economy, a medium-sized [the grand] coalition is stable with the demand[supply]-side policy If the coalition acts strategically, the stable grand coalition implements first best.