因果多元论与认知因果论

Q4 Arts and Humanities Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2006-01-02 DOI:10.21825/philosophica.82198
Jon Williamson
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引用次数: 53

摘要

人们很容易根据因果关系的一个指标来分析因果关系,例如,机制、概率依赖性或独立性、反事实条件或代理考虑。这样的分析固然可以说明原因概念的某些方面,但却不能说明原因概念的全貌。因此,人们可能转而支持多元主义:针对不同场合进行不同的分析。但是我们似乎没有很多不同的原因概念——只有一个折衷的概念。我认为,要解决这个难题,需要我们接受我们的因果信念是由各种各样的指标产生的,但要否认这些指标产生了各种各样的原因概念。这种对证据和因果信念之间关系的关注导致了我所说的“认知”因果关系。在这种观点下,根据观察到的证据,某些因果信念是适当的或合理的;我们的原因概念可以纯粹从这些理性信念的角度来理解。因此,因果关系是我们对世界的认知表征的一个特征,而不是世界本身的特征。这就产生了一个多方面的原因概念。
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Causal Pluralism versus Epistemic Causality
It is tempting to analyse causality in terms of just one of the indicators of causal relationships, e.g., mechanisms, probabilistic dependencies or independencies, counterfactual conditionals or agency considerations. While such an analysis will surely shed light on some aspect of our concept of cause, it will fail to capture the whole, rather multifarious, notion. So one might instead plump for pluralism: a different analysis for a different occasion. But we do not seem to have lots of different concepts of cause - just one eclectic notion. The resolution of this conundrum, I think, requires us to accept that our causal beliefs are generated by a wide variety of indicators, but to deny that this variety of indicators yields a variety of concepts of cause. This focus on the relation between evidence and causal beliefs leads to what I call *epistemic* causality. Under this view, certain causal beliefs are appropriate or rational on the basis of observed evidence; our notion of cause can be understood purely in terms of these rational beliefs. Causality, then, is a feature of our epistemic representation of the world, rather than of the world itself. This yields one, multifaceted notion of cause.
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Argumenta Philosophica
Argumenta Philosophica Arts and Humanities-Visual Arts and Performing Arts
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