解决Lucia之后ALJ移除保护问题

S. Davenport
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Lucia Designated ALJs as Officers of the United States...... 698 C. The President Has the Power to Remove His Officers Which Now Includes ALJs ............................................ 701 II. ALJ REMOVAL PROTECTIONS VIOLATE THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE ...................................................... 702 A. The Court’s Decision to Not Define “Significant Authority” Threatens the Independence of Hundreds of Agency Employees........................................................ 702 B. Removal Protections Raise Constitutional Issues .............. 704 1. Removal Protections Limit Presidential * J.D. Candidate, May 2020, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank the Michigan Journal of Law Reform editors for their feedback and comments through the process. I would like to thank Professor Nicholas Bagley for his comments on an early draft, and I also appreciate the helpful comments from Laurence Batmazian and Gregg Coughlin. 694 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:3 Supervisory Oversight............................................ 704 2. Removing ALJ Tenure Protections Raise Due Process Concerns ........................................... 706 III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF ALJS ............................................................... 708 A. Removing MSPB’s For-Cause Layer of Tenure Protection... 708 B. Changing the Good Cause Standard .............................. 709 C. Establishing an ALJ Corps ........................................... 710 D. Providing ALJs with Article III Tenure Protections ........... 711 E. Move Appointment and Removal to Article III Courts....... 712 IV. SOLUTION TO APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL...................... 713 A. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

大法院在卢西亚诉美国证券交易委员会案(Lucia v. SEC)中判决“行政法官是宪法规定的官员”后,围绕行政法官和相关政府职位的地位引发了大量宪法争议。一个核心问题与法律法官的移除保护有关。法官和总统之间目前有两层保护。在最高法院早些时候的一项裁决中,法院认为,“美国官员”和总统之间的两层任期保护是违宪的,因为它剥夺了总统追究其官员责任的权力。作为公正的审裁官,司法法官需要这些保护来确保公平的审裁听证会。露西娅现在威胁到ALJ的保护。本说明认为,实施一项强制质疑制度,允许审裁聆讯中的每一方将司法法官从其案件的聆讯中移除,将为法院提供一种途径,使其可以证明移除问题是正当的。这样的提议将解决行政监督对总统无法正确实施其政策的担忧。此外,强制质疑将允许诉讼当事人在机构面前能够移除他们认为倾向于该机构的alj。通过处理这两个宪法问题,最高法院可能更有可能发现,现有的两层任期保护对那些担任裁判职务的人是允许的。介绍 ................................................................................694 . aljs和lucia的任免..............696 A。国会颁布了保护行政法官独立的从他们的机构 ........................................................697 B.卢西亚指定司法助理为美国官员......698 c,总统有权删除他的军官,现在包括行政法官 ............................................701二世。行政法官取消违反约定条款的保护 ......................................................702 A。法院的判决不定义“重大权力”威胁到数以百计的独立机构的员工 ........................................................702 B.搬迁保护引发宪法问题..............704年1。2020年5月,密歇根大学法学院法学博士候选人。我要感谢《密歇根法律改革杂志》的编辑们在整个过程中提供的反馈和评论。我要感谢Nicholas Bagley教授对初稿的评论,我也感谢Laurence Batmazian和Gregg Coughlin的有益评论。694密歇根大学法律改革杂志[Vol. 53:3 Supervisory Oversight............................................]704 2。消除行政法官任期保护提高正当程序问题 ...........................................706 III。提出了解决行政法官的任免 ...............................................................708 A。取消MSPB的原因保护层…708 b标准改变好的原因 ..............................709年建立行政法官队 ...........................................710 D.为alj提供第三条所有权保护...........E.将任命和罢免转移到第三条法院.......712第四。解决任免 ......................713 A。定义一个官任命 ..............................714 b .除权的行政法官在一次听证会上,无因回避 ....................................................................715年1。强制性挑战系统的机制....715 2。无因回避竞争解决宪法问题 ........................................718 3。强制制度的潜在挑战......720 4。自由企业基金雕刻出了一个例外 ........................................................................724年的结论 ...................................................................................726
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Resolving ALJ Removal Protections Problem Following Lucia
When the Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC and held that administrative law judges (ALJs) are Officers under the Constitution, the Court opened a flood of constitutional issues around the status of ALJs and related government positions. One central issue relates to ALJs’ removal protections. ALJs currently have two layers of protection between them and the President. In an earlier Supreme Court decision, the Court held that two layers of tenure protection between an “Officer of the United States” and the President was unconstitutional as it deprived the President the power to hold his officers accountable. As impartial adjudicators, ALJs need those layers of protection to ensure fair adjudicative hearings. Lucia now threatens ALJ protections. This Note argues that implementing a peremptory challenge system which would allow each party in an adjudicative hearing to remove the ALJ from hearing its case would create an avenue in which the Court could justify the removal issue. Such a proposal would fix executive oversight concerns about the President being unable to properly implement his policy. Additionally, peremptory challenges would allow litigants in front of an agency be able to remove ALJs they feel are predisposed to the agency. By addressing both constitutional issues, the Court may be more likely to find that the two layers of tenure protection in place are permissible for those in adjudicatory positions. INTRODUCTION................................................................................ 694 I. APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF ALJS AND LUCIA.............. 696 A. Congress Enacted Protections to Keep ALJs Independent from their Agency ........................................................ 697 B. Lucia Designated ALJs as Officers of the United States...... 698 C. The President Has the Power to Remove His Officers Which Now Includes ALJs ............................................ 701 II. ALJ REMOVAL PROTECTIONS VIOLATE THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE ...................................................... 702 A. The Court’s Decision to Not Define “Significant Authority” Threatens the Independence of Hundreds of Agency Employees........................................................ 702 B. Removal Protections Raise Constitutional Issues .............. 704 1. Removal Protections Limit Presidential * J.D. Candidate, May 2020, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank the Michigan Journal of Law Reform editors for their feedback and comments through the process. I would like to thank Professor Nicholas Bagley for his comments on an early draft, and I also appreciate the helpful comments from Laurence Batmazian and Gregg Coughlin. 694 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:3 Supervisory Oversight............................................ 704 2. Removing ALJ Tenure Protections Raise Due Process Concerns ........................................... 706 III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF ALJS ............................................................... 708 A. Removing MSPB’s For-Cause Layer of Tenure Protection... 708 B. Changing the Good Cause Standard .............................. 709 C. Establishing an ALJ Corps ........................................... 710 D. Providing ALJs with Article III Tenure Protections ........... 711 E. Move Appointment and Removal to Article III Courts....... 712 IV. SOLUTION TO APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL...................... 713 A. Defining an Officer for Appointment.............................. 714 B. At-Will Removal of ALJs with Peremptory Challenges in a Hearing .................................................................... 715 1. Mechanics of a Peremptory Challenge System .... 715 2. Peremptory Challenges Resolve Competing Constitutional Concerns........................................ 718 3. Potential Challenges of a Peremptory System...... 720 4. Carving Out an Exception to Free Enterprise Fund ........................................................................ 724 CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 726
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