具有附加需求和价格依赖需求的分散供应链中的回购和价格延迟

Kairen Zhang, Weixin Shang, Weihua Zhou
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引用次数: 2

摘要

我们研究了二元供应链中的回购合同,其中零售商在观察随机需求之前从供应商处订购,并在观察随机需求之后设定零售价格(也称为价格延迟)。我们关注的是具有线性加性需求的情况,众所周知,它比具有线性乘法需求的情况更难处理。在需求不确定性分布的温和条件下,导出了供应商的最优回购契约,得到了如下结果:当且仅当单位生产成本低于需求不确定性分散的阈值时,供应商严格倾向于回购合同而不是批发价格合同;最优回购率随单位生产成本的增加而减小;供应链内部的利润分配和渠道效率取决于需求不确定性的分散。这些结果与线性乘法需求的结果形成鲜明对比。然而,最优回购合同下的操作决策与最优批发价格合同下的操作决策之间的关系与需求倍增的情况是一致的。我们进一步将分析扩展到两个相关的场景。一方面,在一个供应商向两个相互竞争的零售商销售的供应链中,我们的结果继续保持不变。另一方面,当零售商不推迟零售定价决策时,我们建立了最优回购契约的三个独特性质:当且仅当单位生产成本为中间时,供应商严格倾向于回购契约而不是批发价格契约;当供应商严格选择回购合同而非纯批发价格合同时,最优回购率随单位生产成本的增加而增加;价格延迟对零售商和供应链都有利,但并不总是对供应商有利。上述分析表明,当零售商开始实行价格延迟时,供应商在回购和批发价格合约之间的偏好会发生摆动。
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Buyback and price postponement in a decentralized supply chain with additive and price‐dependent demand
We examine buyback contracts in a dyadic supply chain where a retailer orders from a supplier before observing the random demand and sets a retail price after observing it (a.k.a. price postponement). We focus on the case with linear additive demand, which is well known to be less tractable than the case with linear multiplicative demand. With mild conditions on the distribution of demand uncertainty, we derive the supplier's optimal buyback contract and show the following results. The supplier strictly prefers buyback contracts to wholesale price‐only contracts if and only if the unit production cost is lower than a threshold that depends on the dispersion of demand uncertainty; the optimal buyback rate is decreasing in the unit production cost; the profit allocation within the supply chain and channel efficiency depend on the dispersion of demand uncertainty. These results are in stark contrast to those in the case with linear multiplicative demand. Nevertheless, the relation between the operational decisions under the optimal buyback contract and those under the optimal wholesale price‐only contract is consistent with the case of multiplicative demand. We further extend the analysis to two related scenarios. On one hand, our results continue to hold in a supply chain where one supplier sells to two competing retailers. On the other hand, when the retailer does not postpone retail pricing decisions, we establish three distinctive properties of the optimal buyback contract: the supplier strictly prefers buyback contracts to wholesale price‐only contracts if and only if the unit production cost is intermediate; the optimal buyback rate is increasing in the unit production cost in the region where the supplier strictly prefers buyback contracts to wholesale price‐only contracts; price postponement benefits both the retailer and the supply chain but does not always benefit the supplier. The above analysis shows that the supplier's preference between buyback and wholesale price‐only contracts can swing either way when the retailer starts to practice price postponement.
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