Easton I ad Easton II

N THE political science literature called "behavioralist" which has emerged in the past twenty years, two distinct and incompatible approaches have been used. Mathematics has been employed for rank-ordering, for the computation of correlations, and for whatever other purposes numbers may serve. This method is analytical and reductionist and assumes the validity of mechanical cause-andeffect explanation. The other outlook is called "system theory" or "systems theory." Most commonly systems theory appeals to the analogy of organicist biology, which rejects the analytical and reductionist method and adopts a teleological perspective. Its origins are to be found in Aristotle, who believed that all of nature was purposive. The organicist or "organismic" view has been abandoned by virtually all twentieth-century biologists. An exception is Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who revived the organicist outlook in biology in the 1920s and generalized it into a cosmology in 1949.' Systems theory in social science derives from Bertalanffy's advocacy. Like its counterpart in biology, systems theory in social studies is frequently holistic rather than analytical, and ordinarily it seeks to answer the question "why" 2 in terms of function or purpose, in terms of goals, rather than in terms of antecedent propelling causes. The mechanical and organicist approaches are clearly incompatible, but it is very common for a single behavioral author to employ them both. A simulacrum of scientific method is presented in a discussion of cause-and-effect; but functionalist or organicist language is employed to suggest that what is at work is a teleological process. The best-known exponent of systems theory in political science is David Easton of the University of Chicago. The difficulties which result from mixing mechanism and organicism are clearly exemplified in Easton's work. Indeed, it is fair to say that unknown to Easton himself there are two David Eastons. One is a mechanist, the other a vitalist. We will call the former Easton I, the latter Easton II. As might be expected since Easton is oblivious to the mixture the organism Easton cannot be identified entirely with one or the other position at particular periods in the development of Easton's thought; these two incompatible strands compete in his work, with one predominating, then the other. As we will see, a final victory appeared to have been won by vitalism; nevertheless, Easton's presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 1969 his most recent statement concerning "behavioralism" shows that he believes he has been faithful to the assumptions of analytical science. In this same address, he claims for behavioralism a victory over other approaches to the study of politics. He cites his own work as part of a virtually completed "behavioral revolution" in political sci-