Emma Cervantes, Victoria Dodev, Shane Ellement, Isabelle Sawhney
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Reprofiling Today for a Sustainable Tomorrow: A Unilateral Italian Debt Restructuring
Italy should unilaterally extend maturities for its domestic government securities to facilitate an orderly and streamlined restructuring that provides Italy with necessary debt relief.
Italy’s domestic government securities are issued as decrees under a 2003 Consolidated Act (the “Act”). Article 3 of the Act explicitly grants Italy the power to unilaterally extend maturities for all domestic government securities. To exercise this restructuring power, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (the “Ministry”) must issue a framework decree that authorizes the Treasury to unilaterally reprofile Italy’s debt.
In 2011, Edelen et al. first proposed that Italy had the authority under its existing laws to unilaterally reprofile its sovereign debt. The following proposal expands upon and updates the Edelen et al. proposal. It demonstrates that the inclusion of the Collective Action Clauses (“CACs”) in some of its bonds does not foreclose the use of Italy’s Article 3 power. The proposal also describes the mechanics by which Italy would exercise its right to extend maturities. Unilaterally extending maturities does not require any retroactive utilization of the local law advantage. Nor does it expose Italy to significant legal risks in its domestic courts or under European treaties and conventions.