为可持续的明天重塑今天:意大利单方面债务重组

IF 0.6 3区 社会学 Q2 LAW American Bankruptcy Law Journal Pub Date : 2019-04-12 DOI:10.1093/CMLJ/KMAA007
Emma Cervantes, Victoria Dodev, Shane Ellement, Isabelle Sawhney
{"title":"为可持续的明天重塑今天:意大利单方面债务重组","authors":"Emma Cervantes, Victoria Dodev, Shane Ellement, Isabelle Sawhney","doi":"10.1093/CMLJ/KMAA007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Italy should unilaterally extend maturities for its domestic government securities to facilitate an orderly and streamlined restructuring that provides Italy with necessary debt relief. \n \nItaly’s domestic government securities are issued as decrees under a 2003 Consolidated Act (the “Act”). Article 3 of the Act explicitly grants Italy the power to unilaterally extend maturities for all domestic government securities. To exercise this restructuring power, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (the “Ministry”) must issue a framework decree that authorizes the Treasury to unilaterally reprofile Italy’s debt. \n \nIn 2011, Edelen et al. first proposed that Italy had the authority under its existing laws to unilaterally reprofile its sovereign debt. The following proposal expands upon and updates the Edelen et al. proposal. It demonstrates that the inclusion of the Collective Action Clauses (“CACs”) in some of its bonds does not foreclose the use of Italy’s Article 3 power. The proposal also describes the mechanics by which Italy would exercise its right to extend maturities. Unilaterally extending maturities does not require any retroactive utilization of the local law advantage. Nor does it expose Italy to significant legal risks in its domestic courts or under European treaties and conventions.","PeriodicalId":44862,"journal":{"name":"American Bankruptcy Law Journal","volume":"223 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2019-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Reprofiling Today for a Sustainable Tomorrow: A Unilateral Italian Debt Restructuring\",\"authors\":\"Emma Cervantes, Victoria Dodev, Shane Ellement, Isabelle Sawhney\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/CMLJ/KMAA007\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Italy should unilaterally extend maturities for its domestic government securities to facilitate an orderly and streamlined restructuring that provides Italy with necessary debt relief. \\n \\nItaly’s domestic government securities are issued as decrees under a 2003 Consolidated Act (the “Act”). Article 3 of the Act explicitly grants Italy the power to unilaterally extend maturities for all domestic government securities. To exercise this restructuring power, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (the “Ministry”) must issue a framework decree that authorizes the Treasury to unilaterally reprofile Italy’s debt. \\n \\nIn 2011, Edelen et al. first proposed that Italy had the authority under its existing laws to unilaterally reprofile its sovereign debt. The following proposal expands upon and updates the Edelen et al. proposal. It demonstrates that the inclusion of the Collective Action Clauses (“CACs”) in some of its bonds does not foreclose the use of Italy’s Article 3 power. The proposal also describes the mechanics by which Italy would exercise its right to extend maturities. Unilaterally extending maturities does not require any retroactive utilization of the local law advantage. Nor does it expose Italy to significant legal risks in its domestic courts or under European treaties and conventions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44862,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"American Bankruptcy Law Journal\",\"volume\":\"223 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-04-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"American Bankruptcy Law Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/CMLJ/KMAA007\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Bankruptcy Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CMLJ/KMAA007","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

意大利应单方面延长其国内政府债券的到期日,以促进有序和精简的重组,从而为意大利提供必要的债务减免。意大利国内政府证券是根据2003年的《综合法案》(以下简称“法案”)作为法令发行的。该法第3条明确授予意大利单方面延长所有国内政府证券到期日的权力。为了行使这一重组权力,经济和财政部(“财政部”)必须发布一项框架法令,授权财政部单方面重组意大利的债务。2011年,Edelen等人首次提出,根据其现行法律,意大利有权单方面重新配置其主权债务。下面的提案扩展并更新了Edelen等人的提案。它表明,将集体行动条款(“CACs”)纳入其部分债券并不排除意大利使用第三条权力。该提案还描述了意大利行使其延长到期权利的机制。单方面延长到期日不需要追溯利用当地法律优势。它也不会使意大利在国内法院或欧洲条约和公约下面临重大法律风险。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Reprofiling Today for a Sustainable Tomorrow: A Unilateral Italian Debt Restructuring
Italy should unilaterally extend maturities for its domestic government securities to facilitate an orderly and streamlined restructuring that provides Italy with necessary debt relief. Italy’s domestic government securities are issued as decrees under a 2003 Consolidated Act (the “Act”). Article 3 of the Act explicitly grants Italy the power to unilaterally extend maturities for all domestic government securities. To exercise this restructuring power, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (the “Ministry”) must issue a framework decree that authorizes the Treasury to unilaterally reprofile Italy’s debt. In 2011, Edelen et al. first proposed that Italy had the authority under its existing laws to unilaterally reprofile its sovereign debt. The following proposal expands upon and updates the Edelen et al. proposal. It demonstrates that the inclusion of the Collective Action Clauses (“CACs”) in some of its bonds does not foreclose the use of Italy’s Article 3 power. The proposal also describes the mechanics by which Italy would exercise its right to extend maturities. Unilaterally extending maturities does not require any retroactive utilization of the local law advantage. Nor does it expose Italy to significant legal risks in its domestic courts or under European treaties and conventions.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
4
期刊最新文献
Steering Loan Modifications Post-Pandemic Passing the Parcel? Relationship Banking at the Onset of Financial Distress Treatment of Disputed Claims in Corporate Insolvency: Evolving Jurisprudence Paper Series VII - Arrangements and Compromise Government Activism in Bankruptcy
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1