预防和公共卫生中的个性化经济学

Q3 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Forum for Health Economics and Policy Pub Date : 2013-09-01 DOI:10.1515/fhep-2013-0011
D. Kenkel, Hua Wang
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引用次数: 3

摘要

个性化预防利用家族史和预测性基因检测来识别严重疾病的高危人群。预测性基因测试的可用性是一个较新的和仍在发展的现象。许多观察人士看到了个性化预防改善公共卫生的巨大潜力。与此同时,这些新市场的出现引起了人们对成本、成本效益和卫生差距的熟悉的卫生政策关切。本文首先讨论了个性化预防分析的经济框架。在需求方,消费者使用个性化预防作为一种信息形式,使他们能够更好地选择预防,包括医疗保健和健康行为,如饮食和锻炼。在供应方面,复杂的市场力量和法规的相互作用将决定预测性基因测试的价格、广告和保险范围。除了健康保险是否会支付预测性基因检测费用的问题之外,人们还非常关注消费者使用基因检测是否会使他们面临基因歧视的风险或可能导致逆向选择。该论文还报告了对2000年、2005年和2010年全国健康访谈调查中使用预测性基因测试的数据的描述性分析。实证分析表明,在听说过基因检测的消费者中,与社会经济地位相关的巨大差异:例如,受教育程度较低的消费者、黑人和西班牙裔人听说过基因检测的可能性大大降低。来自其他实证研究的证据几乎没有证明基因检测导致保险市场的基因歧视。有更多的证据表明存在逆向选择,基因检测导致消费者购买长期护理保险。最后,对今后的重要研究方向提出了一些初步的思考。这篇论文的目标是回顾相关的研究,以帮助制定一种经济方法和社会科学研究议程,以研究基因检测用于预防的决定因素和后果。
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The Economics of Personalization in Prevention and Public Health
Abstract Personalized prevention uses family history and predictive genetic testing to identify people at high risk of serious diseases. The availability of predictive genetic tests is a newer and still-developing phenomenon. Many observers see tremendous potential for personalized prevention to improve public health. At the same time, the emergence of these new markets raises familiar health policy concerns about costs, cost-effectiveness, and health disparities. This paper first discusses an economic framework for the analysis of personalized prevention. On the demand side, consumers use personalized prevention as a form of information that allows them to make better choices about prevention, including medical care and health behaviors like diet and exercise. On the supply side, an interplay of complex market forces and regulations will determine the prices, advertising, and insurance coverage of predictive genetic tests. Beyond the question of whether health insurance will cover the costs of predictive genetic tests, there is a great deal of concern about whether consumers’ use of genetic tests might place them at risk of genetic discrimination or might lead to adverse selection. The paper also reports descriptive analysis of data from the 2000, 2005, and 2010 National Health Interview Surveys on the use of predictive genetic tests. The empirical analysis documents large socioeconomic status-related disparities in consumers having heard of genetic tests: for example, consumers with less schooling, Blacks, and Hispanics were substantially less likely to have heard of genetic tests. Evidence from other empirical studies provides little evidence that genetic testing leads to genetic discrimination in insurance markets. There is more evidence suggesting adverse selection, where genetic testing leads consumers to purchase long-term care insurance. The paper concludes with some preliminary thoughts about important directions for future research. The goal of the paper is to review relevant research to help develop an economic approach and social science research agenda into the determinants and consequences of genetic tests for prevention.
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来源期刊
Forum for Health Economics and Policy
Forum for Health Economics and Policy Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
8
期刊介绍: Forum for Health Economics & Policy (FHEP) showcases articles in key substantive areas that lie at the intersection of health economics and health policy. The journal uses an innovative structure of forums to promote discourse on the most pressing and timely subjects in health economics and health policy, such as biomedical research and the economy, and aging and medical care costs. Forums are chosen by the Editorial Board to reflect topics where additional research is needed by economists and where the field is advancing rapidly. The journal is edited by Katherine Baicker, David Cutler and Alan Garber of Harvard University, Jay Bhattacharya of Stanford University, Dana Goldman of the University of Southern California and RAND Corporation, Neeraj Sood of the University of Southern California, Anup Malani and Tomas Philipson of University of Chicago, Pinar Karaca Mandic of the University of Minnesota, and John Romley of the University of Southern California. FHEP is sponsored by the Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics at the University of Southern California. A subscription to the journal also includes the proceedings from the National Bureau of Economic Research''s annual Frontiers in Health Policy Research Conference. Topics: Economics, Political economics, Biomedical research and the economy, Aging and medical care costs, Nursing, Cancer studies, Medical treatment, Others related.
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