击败算法:消费者操纵、个性化定价和大数据管理

Xi Li, Krista J. Li
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引用次数: 6

摘要

问题定义:企业大量投资于大数据技术,以收集消费者数据并推断消费者对价格歧视的偏好。然而,消费者可以使用技术设备来操纵他们的数据并欺骗公司以获得更好的交易。我们研究了一家公司如何投资于收集消费者数据并做出定价决策,以及它是否应该向可以操纵其数据的消费者披露其数据收集范围。方法/结果:我们开发了一个博弈论模型来考虑一个市场,在这个市场中,一个公司迎合了对产品有异质偏好的消费者。该公司收集消费者数据以确定其类型并发布个性化价格,而消费者可能会产生操纵数据并模仿其他类型的成本。我们发现,当公司不向消费者披露其数据收集范围时,它收集了更多的消费者数据。当公司披露其数据收集范围时,即使收集更多的数据是没有成本的,它也会减少数据收集。当消费者操作数据的成本更高时,数据收集的最佳范围就会增加,但当消费者需求变得更加异构时,数据收集的最佳范围就会减少。此外,消费者操纵数据的成本降低可能对公司和消费者都不利。最后,数据收集范围的披露增加了企业利润、消费者剩余和社会福利。管理启示:我们的研究结果表明,企业应该根据是否披露数据收集范围、消费者操纵成本和需求异质性来调整其数据收集范围和价格。公共政策应要求企业公开其数据收集范围,以增加消费者剩余和社会福利。即使没有这样的强制性披露政策,企业也应该自愿披露其数据收集范围,以增加利润。此外,培训消费者操纵他们的数据或提高他们对操纵工具的认识的公共教育项目最终会伤害消费者和公司。
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Beating the Algorithm: Consumer Manipulation, Personalized Pricing, and Big Data Management
Problem definition: Firms heavily invest in big data technologies to collect consumer data and infer consumer preferences for price discrimination. However, consumers can use technological devices to manipulate their data and fool firms to obtain better deals. We examine how a firm invests in collecting consumer data and makes pricing decisions and whether it should disclose its scope of data collection to consumers who can manipulate their data. Methodology/results: We develop a game-theoretic model to consider a market in which a firm caters to consumers with heterogeneous preferences for a product. The firm collects consumer data to identify their types and issue an individualized price, whereas consumers can incur a cost to manipulate data and mimic the other type. We find that when the firm does not disclose its scope of data collection to consumers, it collects more consumer data. When the firm discloses its scope of data collection, it reduces data collection even when collecting more data is costless. The optimal scope of data collection increases when it is more costly for consumers to manipulate data but decreases when consumer demand becomes more heterogeneous. Moreover, a lower cost for consumers to manipulate data can be detrimental to both the firm and consumers. Lastly, disclosure of data collection scope increases firm profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Managerial implications: Our findings suggest that a firm should adjust its scope of data collection and prices based on whether the firm discloses the data collection scope, consumers’ manipulation cost, and demand heterogeneity. Public policies should require firms to disclose their data collection scope to increase consumer surplus and social welfare. Even without such a mandatory disclosure policy, firms should voluntarily disclose their data collection scope to increase profit. Moreover, public educational programs that train consumers to manipulate their data or raise their awareness of manipulation tools can ultimately hurt consumers and firms.
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