危险的信心吗?中国对核升级的看法

IF 4.8 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS International Security Pub Date : 2019-10-01 DOI:10.1162/isec_a_00359
Fiona S. Cunningham, M. T. Fravel
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引用次数: 26

摘要

中国对核升级的看法是评估中美危机或武装冲突中核升级可能性的关键,但尚未得到系统研究。对原始中文资料的回顾和对中国战略社区成员的采访表明,中国对一旦使用核武器就能控制核升级持怀疑态度,因此,领导人将受到限制,即使是有限的使用。这些观点反映在中国的核作战理论(只概述了报复性打击计划,没有任何明确的有限核使用计划)及其部队结构(没有战术核武器)中。中国核战略与常规战略的长期脱钩,中国战略共同体内部的组织偏见,以及空间、网络和常规导弹武器作为战略杠杆的替代来源的可用性,最好地解释了中国对核升级的看法。中国对中美冲突不会升级为使用核武器的信心,可能会妨碍其识别这种情况下核升级风险的能力。与此同时,美国学者和政策制定者强调与中国冲突无意中升级的风险,但他们比中国同行更有信心,认为核武器的使用仍然是有限的。当这些截然不同的观点结合在一起时,可能会给美中冲突带来压力,使其迅速升级为一场无限的核战争。
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Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation
Abstract Chinese views of nuclear escalation are key to assessing the potential for nuclear escalation in a crisis or armed conflict between the United States and China, but they have not been examined systematically. A review of original Chinese-language sources and interviews with members of China's strategic community suggest that China is skeptical that nuclear escalation could be controlled once nuclear weapons are used and, thus, leaders would be restrained from pursuing even limited use. These views are reflected in China's nuclear operational doctrine (which outlines plans for retaliatory strikes only and lacks any clear plans for limited nuclear use) and its force structure (which lacks tactical nuclear weapons). The long-standing decoupling of Chinese nuclear and conventional strategy, organizational biases within China's strategic community, and the availability of space, cyber, and conventional missile weapons as alternative sources of strategic leverage best explain Chinese views toward nuclear escalation. China's confidence that a U.S.-China conflict would not escalate to the use of nuclear weapons may hamper its ability to identify nuclear escalation risks in such a scenario. Meanwhile, U.S. scholars and policymakers emphasize the risk of inadvertent escalation in a conflict with China, but they are more confident than their Chinese counterparts that the use of nuclear weapons could remain limited. When combined, these contrasting views could create pressure for a U.S.-China conflict to escalate rapidly into an unlimited nuclear war.
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来源期刊
International Security
International Security Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
7.40
自引率
10.00%
发文量
13
期刊介绍: International Security publishes lucid, well-documented essays on the full range of contemporary security issues. Its articles address traditional topics of war and peace, as well as more recent dimensions of security, including environmental, demographic, and humanitarian issues, transnational networks, and emerging technologies. International Security has defined the debate on US national security policy and set the agenda for scholarship on international security affairs for more than forty years. The journal values scholarship that challenges the conventional wisdom, examines policy, engages theory, illuminates history, and discovers new trends. Readers of IS discover new developments in: The causes and prevention of war U.S.-China relations Great power politics Ethnic conflict and intra-state war Terrorism and insurgency Regional security in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America U.S. foreign and defense policy International relations theory Diplomatic and military history Cybersecurity and defense technology Political economy, business, and security Nuclear proliferation.
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