普遍泛化是如何根据自然理性运作的

Q2 Arts and Humanities Cogency Pub Date : 2022-01-26 DOI:10.32995/cogency.v13i2.366
Kyle S. Hodge
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引用次数: 0

摘要

普遍泛化,如果它不是最难以理解的推理规则在自然演绎,那么它是最不被很好地解释或证明。这个推论规则,从表面上看,是相当有野心的:根据一个事物的事实,我可以推断出这个事实适用于这个事物所属的类别的所有事物——这个类别可以包含无限多的事物。这样的推论如何能够自信地从前提到结论保持真理的有效性或能力?我在这篇文章中的目标是解释普遍泛化是如何以一种有意义的方式保持真理的能力。在此过程中,我将回顾普遍概括的常见解释,并解释为什么它们是不充分的,或者在解释上不令人满意。令人高兴的是,我的叙述没有本体论或认识论的假设,因此应该与读者喜欢的任何本体论或认识论方案兼容。
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How universal generalization works according to natural reason
Universal Generalization, if it is not the most poorly understood inference rule in natural deduction, then it is the least well explained or justified. The inference rule is, prima facie, quite ambitious: on the basis of a fact established of one thing, I may infer that the fact holds of every thing in the class to which the one belongs—a class which may contain indefinitely many things. How can such an inference be made with any confidence as to its validity or ability to preserve truth from premise to conclusion? My goal in this paper is to explain how Universal Generalization works in a way that makes sense of its ability to preserve truth. In doing so, I shall review common accounts of Universal Generalization and explain why they are inadequate or are explanatorily unsatisfying. Happily, my account makes no ontological or epistemological presumptions and therefore should be compatible with whichever ontological or epistemological schemes the reader prefers.
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来源期刊
Cogency
Cogency Arts and Humanities-Language and Linguistics
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
5
审稿时长
12 weeks
期刊介绍: Cogency is an international journal devoted to research and scholarship in reasoning and argumentation. The journal seeks to be a source of reference which elucidates our understanding of these fields of study with a particular interest in their educational dimension. It aims to contribute to education by advancing our theoretical and practical understanding of reasoning and argumentation. Authors are encourage to use and integrate perspectives originating in psychology, philosophy, linguistics, formal and informal logic, rhetoric, critical thinking, amongst others disciplines and angles. Cogency publishes articles and book reviews.
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