The Netherlands selling submarines to Taiwan: how to judge government action?

The Dutch sale of major weapons to Taiwan in 1980 ran counter to the Netherlands’ recent recognition of the People’s Republic of China as the sole representative of China. This led to a rupture of diplomatic relations, an outcome seemingly unexpected in spite of the Dutch Foreign Ministry’s strong opposition to the deal. A few years later a new government composed of the same parties turned down a follow-up order. Why did the Dutch government sail so close to the wind and what made it change course? Such questions are tackled using approaches from international relations theory, such as politico-military strategy, good judgment in foreign policy, and (international) political economy. Yet in this case the analyst cannot be satisfied with easy explanations. Might not a fruitful angle be to consider the Netherlands as a highly competent but small state, driven by the high stakes involved to explore to the limit what little manoeuvring room it had vis-a-vis China?