基于演化博弈视角的中美制造业贸易摩擦前景分析

CONVERTER Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI:10.17762/converter.86
Jianjun Zhou, Jing Yang, Xiaocheng Huang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

2018年以来的中美贸易摩擦是两国贸易关系的重要转折点。作为世界两大制造业大国,中美之间的摩擦将对世界产生深远影响。本文梳理了两国近十年的经贸实力对比、进出口依存度、贸易结构变化。然后从演化博弈的角度构建了中美两国在贸易摩擦中战略选择的动态演化模型。最后,通过对动态方程的复制,分析了进化博弈平衡点的稳定性。结果表明,当两国中至少有一方的合作收益小于竞争带来的投机收益时,(竞争、竞争)是唯一进化稳定的策略组合,双方都将采取竞争措施。两国采取(合作、合作)战略相结合的前提是,当一方选择合作,另一方采取竞争战略时,两国合作战略所获得的净收益大于所获得的投机收益。两国选择合作战略的概率与合作带来的收益成正比,与合作成本、坚持合作战略的损失、放弃合作的投机收益成反比。两国的贸易政策不可能一蹴而就,但可以通过相互模仿和学习,逐步趋于稳定和平衡。
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The Prospect Analysis of Sino-US Manufacturing Trade Friction Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game
The Sino-US trade friction since 2018 is an important turning point in trade relations between these two countries. As the world's two major manufacturing powers, the friction will have a profound impact on the world. This articlesorts out the comparison of economic and trade strength between these two countries in the past ten years, the dependence of import and export, and the changes in trade structure. Then we construct a dynamic evolutionary model of the strategic choices of these two countries in trade friction from the perspective of evolutionary game. Finally, we analyze the stability of the equilibrium point of the evolutionary game by copying the dynamic equation. The results show that when at least one of these two countries has a cooperative benefit less than the speculative benefits brought about by competition, (competition,competition) is the only evolutionary stable strategy combination, andboth of them will adopt competitive measures. The prerequisite for the combination of (cooperation, cooperation) strategies adopted by these two countries are that the net benefits obtained by the two countries' cooperation strategies are greater than the speculative benefits obtained when one side chooses to cooperate and the other side adopts competitive strategy. The probability that two countries choose cooperation strategy is directly proportional to benefits brought about by cooperation and inversely proportional to the cost of cooperation, the loss of sticking to the cooperation strategy, and the speculative benefits of abandoning cooperation. The trade policies of these two countries cannot be achieved overnight, but can gradually tend to be stable and balanced through mutual imitation and learning.
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