信用风险转移工具的信息极性识别监管产品干预与产品责任框架案例

Odunayo Olowookere
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摘要

金融创新为各方提供了一个通融的途径,通过有效地将风险转移到其他各方,从而在整个金融体系中扩散,从而制定战略手段来预防或避免风险。这种转移有多种方式,其中最臭名昭著的是通过信用风险转移(CRT)工具。因此,转移风险或视风险为有价值的意识形态以及这种转移的便利性助长了投资者的风险偏好,使他们低估了他们所承担的信用风险的含义,使投资者未能采取必要的保护措施来防止过度的风险获取。信用风险转移市场允许资本配置和高流动性信用风险转移工具的有效流动。通过实现这一点,市场最终通过推动贷款和信贷市场的“原创-分销”模式,允许风险管理中的机会主义。机会主义的过程是这样的:在风险偏好上升的时期,不健全的担保和风险分散机制将各种容易被推销的信用风险纠缠在一起,从而助长了人为错误和道德风险。不用说,这个过程并不总是那么简单。自由的监管反应允许信息积累的两极分化,从而强化了机会主义。作为投资者决策基础的信息需要全面和“忠实”的披露,不幸的是,在信用风险转移中通常不是这样。一种被接受但不合理的信念,即在信贷工具池或衍生金融产品类型中,有关构成信用风险的过多信息会阻碍流动性和投资者的兴趣;是初级金融机构的信条。相信市场机制能够比直接和精确的监管干预更有效地“纠正异常”,这进一步阻碍了监管干预。这项工作的目的是试图指出自由监管态度对信用风险转移活动的缺陷,并通过关注信息的可用性和收集,并通过检查在其福利适用性和信息效率方面经过时间考验的监管制度,倡导一种更适合福利的信用风险转移制度方法。虽然本质上是理论性的,但这项工作旨在通过发展金融法律理论,作为金融产品理论间分析的媒介
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Identifying the Information Polarities in Credit Risk Transfer Instruments; A Case for Regulatory Product Intervention and Product Liability Framework
Financial innovation provides an accommodating avenue for parties to develop strategic means to prevent or avoid risk by spreading it across the financial system through efficient transferral to other parties. This transferral is done in numerous ways, the most notorious of which is through Credit Risk Transfer (CRT) Instruments. Consequently, the ideology of moving risk or seeing risk as being valuable and the ease of doing such transferral feeds the risk appetite of investors and makes them underestimate the implication of the credit risk they take, making investors fail to take the required protective measures to prevent excessive risk acquisition. The Credit Risk Transfer Markets allow the efficient flow of capital allocation and highly liquid Credit Risk Transfer instruments. By enabling this, markets consequently permit opportunism in risk management by propelling the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model of the Loan and Credit markets. The opportunism process goes thus: human error and moral hazard are encouraged by under collateralisation and risk dispersal mechanisms that tangle-up various Credit Risk that is easy to market in a period of increased risk appetite. Needless to say, the process is not always so straight-jacketed. Liberal regulatory and supervisory responses strengthen the opportunism by allowing the polarisation of Information accumulation. The information being the basis on which investor decisions are made require comprehensive and ‘faithful’ disclosure which, unfortunately, usually is not the case in Credit Risk Transfer. An accepted but irrational belief in the notion that excessive information about the constituent credit risk formulating a substantial portion in a pool of credit instruments or a genre of derivative financial products deters liquidity and investor interest; is a creed in the primary financial institutions. Regulatory intervention is further hindered by the belief in the market mechanisms ability to ‘correct anomalies’ more efficiently than a direct and precise regulatory intervention would. The aim of this work is to attempt pointing out the flaws in the liberal regulatory attitude to Credit Risk Transfer activities and advocate a more welfare-suitable approach to Credit Risk Transfer regime by focusing on information availability and collection, and by examining regulatory systems that have been time-tested on their welfare suitability and information efficiency. Though theoretical in nature, this work seeks to serve as a medium for inter-doctrinal analysis of financial products by developing on the legal theory of finance
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