挤进去还是挤出去?补贴如何标志社会企业财务独立的道路

IF 2.7 Q2 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION Perspectives on Public Management and Governance Pub Date : 2021-07-27 DOI:10.1093/ppmgov/gvab014
P. Reichert, M. Hudon, A. Szafarz, R. Christensen
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引用次数: 4

摘要

在今天的多部门结构中,公共和私人补贴是否以及如何影响社会企业追求财务稳定的问题并不明确。我们讨论了捐助者在社会企业生命周期中的战略作用,即社会企业初创企业依赖补贴,而成熟的社会企业争取独立于捐助者。为了解决“中间缺失”的问题,我们开发了补贴工具的类型学和中介信号模型,以阐明补贴如何影响社会企业成果的演变。我们认为,来源差异对某些工具(如企业无形资产和政府补贴信贷担保)很重要,这些工具会引发挤进效应并吸引商业伙伴,同时防止反常的挤出效应,如软预算约束。为了说明这个商业化的故事,我们借鉴了一个小额信贷案例研究,展示了公共和私人捐助者如何诱导挤进和挤出效应。简而言之,我们的补贴类型有助于揭示公共和私人补贴向社会企业的商业资助者发出的信号,以及它们如何塑造未来财务独立的道路。
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Crowding-in or Crowding-out? How Subsidies Signal the Path to Financial Independence of Social Enterprises
In today’s multisector configurations, there is little clarity about whether and how public and private subsidies influence social enterprises’ pursuit of financial stability. We address the strategic role of donors in the social-business life cycle whereby social enterprise start-ups rely on subsidies, while mature social enterprises strive for independence from donors. To address the “missing middle,” we develop a typology of subsidy instruments and an intermediary signaling model to clarify how subsidies shape the evolution of outcomes for social enterprises. We argue that source variation matters for certain instruments like corporate intangibles and governmentally subsidized credit guarantees, which trigger crowding-in effects and attract commercial partners, while preventing perverse crowding-out effects, such as soft budget constraints. To illustrate this commercialization story, we draw upon a microfinance case study, demonstrating how public and private donors can induce crowding-in and crowding-out effects. In short, our subsidy typology helps unpack the signals that public and private subsidies send to commercial funders of social enterprises and how they shape the path to future financial independence.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.30
自引率
6.20%
发文量
28
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