{"title":"部长们也有偏袒","authors":"Philine Widmer, Noémie Zurlinden","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3818193","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study favoritism by cabinet members in 36 African countries and hand-collect birthplace information for all cabinet members (2001-2015). We focus on health outcomes and provide causal evidence of favoritism by health ministers and, to a lower degree, key ministers. Neonates' and infants' mortality is lower when the current health minister originates from their region. Increased healthcare access can partly explain this effect. Moreover, we find some evidence that the health ministers' regions benefit from higher health aid flows. We conclude that ministers' favoritism manifests itself in diverse forms.","PeriodicalId":13563,"journal":{"name":"Insurance & Financing in Health Economics eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Ministers Engage in Favoritism Too\",\"authors\":\"Philine Widmer, Noémie Zurlinden\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3818193\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study favoritism by cabinet members in 36 African countries and hand-collect birthplace information for all cabinet members (2001-2015). We focus on health outcomes and provide causal evidence of favoritism by health ministers and, to a lower degree, key ministers. Neonates' and infants' mortality is lower when the current health minister originates from their region. Increased healthcare access can partly explain this effect. Moreover, we find some evidence that the health ministers' regions benefit from higher health aid flows. We conclude that ministers' favoritism manifests itself in diverse forms.\",\"PeriodicalId\":13563,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Insurance & Financing in Health Economics eJournal\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-09-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Insurance & Financing in Health Economics eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3818193\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Insurance & Financing in Health Economics eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3818193","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We study favoritism by cabinet members in 36 African countries and hand-collect birthplace information for all cabinet members (2001-2015). We focus on health outcomes and provide causal evidence of favoritism by health ministers and, to a lower degree, key ministers. Neonates' and infants' mortality is lower when the current health minister originates from their region. Increased healthcare access can partly explain this effect. Moreover, we find some evidence that the health ministers' regions benefit from higher health aid flows. We conclude that ministers' favoritism manifests itself in diverse forms.