From the editors

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to debates about its motives, the chances of aggression elsewhere, the dangers of nuclear instability, the prospects for deterrence, and the future of nuclear disarmament. The articles in this issue address these questions. What drives Russian strategy? In ‘Conspiracy theories in Russian security thinking,’ Martin Krugh of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Uppsala Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Erik Andermo of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Liliia Makashova examine a pattern of conspiratorial ideas that circulate throughout the Russian defense community. According to the authors, leading think tanks promote a worldview stressing Russian victimization. Supposed threats from the United States and NATO justify Russian foreign policy and domestic repression. The authors leave open the possibility that these theories do not really influence Russian decision makers at high levels, who may operate according to a more level-headed assessment of state interests and the balance of powers. Even in this case, however, the presence of entrenched conspiratorial thinking may act as a constraint on policymakers. Negotiating with the West might prove difficult to justify to domestic audiences who have absorbed worst-case assumptions about Western intentions. Will Russia expand its military campaign? In ‘Russian strategy towards the Nordic region: Tracing continuity and change,’ Karen-Anna Eggen of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies examines whether Russian activism in Ukraine foreshadows a more active policy in Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland, along with Artic Ocean and Baltic Sea. Eggen sees continuity in Russia’s goals in the region. It has consistently sought to maximize its own political influence, minimizing that of the