Ana M. Albuquerque, Gus De Franco, Rodrigo S. Verdi
{"title":"CEO薪酬中的同伴选择","authors":"Ana M. Albuquerque, Gus De Franco, Rodrigo S. Verdi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1362047","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Current research shows that firms are more likely to benchmark against peers that pay their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) higher compensation, reflecting self-serving behavior. We propose an alternative explanation: the choice of highly paid peers represents a reward for unobserved CEO talent. We test this hypothesis by decomposing the effect of peer selection into talent and self-serving components. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the association between a firm’s selection of highly paid peers and CEO pay mostly represents compensation for CEO talent.","PeriodicalId":76903,"journal":{"name":"Employee benefits journal","volume":"224 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"213","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Peer Choice in CEO Compensation\",\"authors\":\"Ana M. Albuquerque, Gus De Franco, Rodrigo S. Verdi\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1362047\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Current research shows that firms are more likely to benchmark against peers that pay their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) higher compensation, reflecting self-serving behavior. We propose an alternative explanation: the choice of highly paid peers represents a reward for unobserved CEO talent. We test this hypothesis by decomposing the effect of peer selection into talent and self-serving components. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the association between a firm’s selection of highly paid peers and CEO pay mostly represents compensation for CEO talent.\",\"PeriodicalId\":76903,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Employee benefits journal\",\"volume\":\"224 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-08-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"213\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Employee benefits journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1362047\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Employee benefits journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1362047","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Current research shows that firms are more likely to benchmark against peers that pay their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) higher compensation, reflecting self-serving behavior. We propose an alternative explanation: the choice of highly paid peers represents a reward for unobserved CEO talent. We test this hypothesis by decomposing the effect of peer selection into talent and self-serving components. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the association between a firm’s selection of highly paid peers and CEO pay mostly represents compensation for CEO talent.
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