民主投票规则的决策成本与福利效应:一个实验分析

Q3 Social Sciences World Political Science Pub Date : 2012-09-10 DOI:10.1515/wpsr-2012-0008

Ulrich Glassmann, Jan Sauermann

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引用次数: 0

摘要

多数决定原则和一致同意原则对福利和决策成本有什么影响?根据Buchanan和Tullock([1962] 1999)的观点，一致同意原则必须被视为一种民主规范，因为它保证了帕累托有效的福利效应。我们提出了一个公共产品博弈的实验结果，与此假设相反，多数决定规则比一致同意规则能产生更大的福利效应。这一结果表明了对理论方法的批判性修正，这些方法在这方面缩小了多数决定原则的合法性。

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Decision Costs and Welfare Effects of Democratic Voting Rules: an Experimental Analysis

Abstract What impact do majority rule and unanimity rule have on welfare and decision costs? According to Buchanan and Tullock ([1962] 1999) the unanimity principle must be regarded as a democratic norm, because it guarantees Pareto-efficient welfare effects. We present experimental results from a public goods game, which demonstrate in contrast to this assumption that majority rule can produce greater welfare effects than unanimity rule. This result suggests a critical revision of theoretical approaches which narrow the legitimacy of majority rule in this respect.

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World Political Science Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations

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0.70

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0.00%

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期刊介绍： World Political Science (WPS) publishes translations of prize-winning articles nominated by prominent national political science associations and journals around the world. Scholars in a field as international as political science need to know about important political research produced outside the English-speaking world. Sponsored by the International Political Science Association (IPSA), the premiere global political science organization with membership from national assoications 50 countries worldwide WPS gathers together and translates an ever-increasing number of countries'' best political science articles, bridging the language barriers that have made this cutting-edge research inaccessible up to now. Articles in the World Political Science cover a wide range of subjects of interest to readers concerned with the systematic analysis of political issues facing national, sub-national and international governments and societies. Fields include Comparative Politics, International Relations, Political Sociology, Political Theory, Political Economy, and Public Administration and Policy. Anyone interested in the central issues of the day, whether they are students, policy makers, or other citizens, will benefit from greater familiarity with debates about the nature and solutions to social, economic and political problems carried on in non-English language forums.

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