{"title":"监管透明度的重要性","authors":"Samuel Miranda, Ralph Caruso","doi":"10.1115/1.4056536","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n The annual audit plan of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which was issued in November 2020, included an audit of the NRC’s practice of allowing “drop-in” visits. These are closed meetings of senior executives of licensees and NRC management. NRC procedures assume that “drop-in” visits do not concern any matters that are related to pending regulatory decisions that could affect the interests of those licensees. The audit objective was to determine whether NRC policies and procedures for non-public interactions with industry stakeholders are adequate to prevent compromise of the independence of agency staff or the appearance of conflicts of interest. The results of this audit were issued in August 2022. In 2017, the OIG conducted another audit [USNRC, OIG-17-A-23, “Audit of NRC's 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Review Process,” August 22, 2017, ADAMS No. ML17234A561] that focused on the public’s trust and confidence in the NRC. That audit examined the procedure that the NRC staff used to evaluate 10 CFR §2.206 enforcement petitions. The OIG found that the NRC staff had not issued a single enforcement order, as the result of 38 enforcement petitions that it had received in the prior three fiscal years, ending in 2016. The OIG concluded that the lack of such actions could adversely affect the public’s perspective on the effectiveness of the agency’s 10 CFR 2.206 petition process. Both audits are discussed in context with examples that illustrate the NRC’s implementation of its policy of transparency, in theory and practice.","PeriodicalId":8652,"journal":{"name":"ASME Open Journal of Engineering","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Importance of Transparency in Regulation\",\"authors\":\"Samuel Miranda, Ralph Caruso\",\"doi\":\"10.1115/1.4056536\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n The annual audit plan of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which was issued in November 2020, included an audit of the NRC’s practice of allowing “drop-in” visits. These are closed meetings of senior executives of licensees and NRC management. NRC procedures assume that “drop-in” visits do not concern any matters that are related to pending regulatory decisions that could affect the interests of those licensees. The audit objective was to determine whether NRC policies and procedures for non-public interactions with industry stakeholders are adequate to prevent compromise of the independence of agency staff or the appearance of conflicts of interest. The results of this audit were issued in August 2022. In 2017, the OIG conducted another audit [USNRC, OIG-17-A-23, “Audit of NRC's 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Review Process,” August 22, 2017, ADAMS No. ML17234A561] that focused on the public’s trust and confidence in the NRC. That audit examined the procedure that the NRC staff used to evaluate 10 CFR §2.206 enforcement petitions. The OIG found that the NRC staff had not issued a single enforcement order, as the result of 38 enforcement petitions that it had received in the prior three fiscal years, ending in 2016. The OIG concluded that the lack of such actions could adversely affect the public’s perspective on the effectiveness of the agency’s 10 CFR 2.206 petition process. Both audits are discussed in context with examples that illustrate the NRC’s implementation of its policy of transparency, in theory and practice.\",\"PeriodicalId\":8652,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ASME Open Journal of Engineering\",\"volume\":\"48 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ASME Open Journal of Engineering\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1115/1.4056536\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ASME Open Journal of Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1115/1.4056536","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
美国核管理委员会(NRC)监察长办公室(OIG)于2020年11月发布的年度审计计划,包括对NRC允许“临时”访问的做法进行审计。这些是被许可方的高级管理人员和NRC管理层的非公开会议。核管理委员会的程序假定“临时”访问不涉及任何与可能影响被许可人利益的未决监管决定有关的事项。审计目的是确定NRC与行业利益相关者进行非公开互动的政策和程序是否足以防止损害机构工作人员的独立性或出现利益冲突。审计结果于2022年8月公布。2017年,OIG进行了另一项审计[USNRC, OIG-17- a -23,“审计NRC的10 CFR 2.206请愿审查程序”,2017年8月22日,ADAMS号。ML17234A561]重点关注公众对核管理委员会的信任和信心。该审计审查了NRC工作人员用于评估10份CFR§2.206执行请愿书的程序。监察长发现,在截至2016年的前三个财政年度,核管理委员会收到了38份执行请求,但其工作人员没有发布过一份执行命令。OIG的结论是,缺乏此类行动可能会对公众对该机构10cfr 2.206请愿程序有效性的看法产生不利影响。这两次审计都是在背景下讨论的,并举例说明了NRC在理论和实践中实施其透明度政策的情况。
The annual audit plan of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which was issued in November 2020, included an audit of the NRC’s practice of allowing “drop-in” visits. These are closed meetings of senior executives of licensees and NRC management. NRC procedures assume that “drop-in” visits do not concern any matters that are related to pending regulatory decisions that could affect the interests of those licensees. The audit objective was to determine whether NRC policies and procedures for non-public interactions with industry stakeholders are adequate to prevent compromise of the independence of agency staff or the appearance of conflicts of interest. The results of this audit were issued in August 2022. In 2017, the OIG conducted another audit [USNRC, OIG-17-A-23, “Audit of NRC's 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Review Process,” August 22, 2017, ADAMS No. ML17234A561] that focused on the public’s trust and confidence in the NRC. That audit examined the procedure that the NRC staff used to evaluate 10 CFR §2.206 enforcement petitions. The OIG found that the NRC staff had not issued a single enforcement order, as the result of 38 enforcement petitions that it had received in the prior three fiscal years, ending in 2016. The OIG concluded that the lack of such actions could adversely affect the public’s perspective on the effectiveness of the agency’s 10 CFR 2.206 petition process. Both audits are discussed in context with examples that illustrate the NRC’s implementation of its policy of transparency, in theory and practice.