省长与地区经济精英的政治冲突(以卡累利阿共和国为例)

IF 2.9 1区 哲学 Q1 ETHICS Journal of Political Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-06-23 DOI:10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-118-135
D. Stremoukhov
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在一个故意将经济精英置于与当局不平等的地位的体制中,为什么一些地方企业家会与俄罗斯联邦地方单位的负责人发生冲突?通过对卡累利阿州长与商人之间冲突的分析,作者假设围绕再分配的矛盾,以及分支亲信网络等独立资源的可用性,推动了这种对抗。根据作者的结论,联邦中心也发挥了重要作用。在决定是否开始与州长对抗时,地区行动者可以指望莫斯科的支持和一位不受欢迎的地区领导人的辞职。然而,由于外部环境(主要是制度环境和信息环境)的特殊性,这种行为的合理性往往较低。选举威权主义所依赖的不透明的非正式规则影响了行动者创造足够认知图式的能力。区域精英们所处的信息环境,向他们发出了关于可接受行动的限度及其可能后果的不明确和矛盾的信号。反过来,选举和政党制度的正式保留导致身份的形成,从而缩小了可用的行为策略。相互学习的机制也不起作用:在反方可利用的资源无法核实的情况下,游戏规则随着州长的更替而改变,依赖以往的经验充满了战略误判。
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Political Conflicts between Governors and Regional Economic Elites (Case of the Republic of Karelia)
Why do some regional entrepreneurs engage in conflicts with the heads of the subnational units of the Russian Federation within a system that puts economic elites in a deliberately unequal position in relation to the authorities? Based on the analysis of conflicts between governors and businessmen in Karelia, the author hypothesizes that contradictions around redistribution, combined with the availability of the independent resources e.g., branchy patronal networks, drive such confrontation. According to the author’s conclusion, the federal center also plays a significant role. When deciding whether to start confrontation with governors, regional actors could count on the support from Moscow and resignation of an undesirable regional leader. However, due to the peculiarity of the external environment, primarily institutional and informational, the rationality of such behavior often turns out to be low. The opaque informal rules, which electoral authoritarianism relies upon, affect the ability of actors to create adequate cognitive schemata. The informational environment, in which the regional elites operate, sends them unclear and contradictory signals about the limits of acceptable actions and their possible consequences. In turn, the formal preservation of an institution of elections and parties leads to the formation of identities that narrow the set of available behavioral strategies. The mechanism of mutual learning does not work either: under conditions when the resources available to counter-actors cannot be verified, and the rules of the game change with a governor’s turnover, reliance on the previous experience is fraught with strategic miscalculations.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
5.60%
发文量
17
期刊介绍: The Journal of Political Philosophy is an international journal devoted to the study of theoretical issues arising out of moral, legal and political life. It welcomes, and hopes to foster, work cutting across a variety of disciplinary concerns, among them philosophy, sociology, history, economics and political science. The journal encourages new approaches, including (but not limited to): feminism; environmentalism; critical theory, post-modernism and analytical Marxism; social and public choice theory; law and economics, critical legal studies and critical race studies; and game theoretic, socio-biological and anthropological approaches to politics. It also welcomes work in the history of political thought which builds to a larger philosophical point and work in the philosophy of the social sciences and applied ethics with broader political implications. Featuring a distinguished editorial board from major centres of thought from around the globe, the journal draws equally upon the work of non-philosophers and philosophers and provides a forum of debate between disparate factions who usually keep to their own separate journals.
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