量子力学,机会和模态

Q4 Arts and Humanities Argumenta Philosophica Pub Date : 2010-01-02 DOI:10.21825/philosophica.82163
D. Dieks
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引用次数: 41

摘要

这篇文章的论点很简单:即使人们接受量子力学基本上是一个概率论,这也没有特别的理由让我们相信“机会”,因为客观存在的因素决定了我们在实验中遇到的相对频率。更一般地说,量子力学没有给我们特别的理由去相信模态的实际存在。我们可能本能地倾向于相信机会是一种原因,就像在经典力学中我们倾向于认为力是产生加速度的因果力量一样。甚至有可能,这种直觉可以发展成一种连贯的形而上学方案(我认为,这还有待完成)。但正如我将要论证的,一个冷静的休谟的量子力学观点当然也是可能的,而且有很多值得推荐的地方。简而言之,本文的论点是,对于一个休谟来说,量子力学并没有给他提供放弃他的立场的理由。
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Quantum Mechanics, Chance and Modality
The thesis of this article is simple: even if it is accepted that quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory, this provides us with no special reason to believe in “chances” in the sense of objectively existing factors that are responsible for the relative frequencies we encounter in experiments. More in general, quantum mechanics gives us no special reason to believe in the actual existence of modalities. We may intuitively be inclined to believe in chances as a kind of causes, just as in classical mechanics we are inclined to think of forces as causal powers that produce accelerations. It might even be the case that intuitions of this kind can be developed into a coherent metaphysical scheme (something which has yet to be done, I think). But as I shall argue, a sober Humean perspective on quantum mechanics is certainly possible as well, and has much to recommend it. In short, the thesis of the present paper is that for a Humean, quantum mechanics introduces no reasons to abandon his position.
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Argumenta Philosophica
Argumenta Philosophica Arts and Humanities-Visual Arts and Performing Arts
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