最高的风险

Benjamin Edwards
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引用次数: 0

摘要

虽然许多人讨论了可能因多数保守的最高法院而产生的社会问题,但目前最高法院的一个关键后果被忽视了:最高法院在产生或避免系统性风险方面的作用。一段时间以来,系统性金融风险一直由自我监管组织(sro)(如存款信托公司)和联邦监管机构(如金融稳定监督委员会)共同监管。然而,最高法院最近的判例现在造成了真正的风险,即联邦法院将宣布基石sro违宪,因为它们不符合18世纪的宪法框架。sro是不受重视的监管实体,由行业成员组成,在联邦行政机构的恭敬监督下监管自己的行业。虽然普通的公民讨论完全忽略了sro,但它们在法律和经济方面发挥着关键作用,并行使联邦政府授予它们的巨大权力。然而,作为名义上的私人实体,它们执行联邦法律和自己的规则,而不遵守对政府实体施加的限制,比如提供正当程序。本文对金融监管与宪法学这两个少有互动的学科的文献做出了三点贡献。首先,它详细描述了sro如何在功能上融入联邦政府,并担任联邦执法和监管机构。其次,它展示了在保守派占多数的最高法院下,四种不同的宪法原则是如何重新抬头的,它们对现有的SRO模式构成了生死存亡的威胁。第三,该条解释了最高法院宣布sro违宪或限制其权力的决定如何产生系统性风险并可能引发金融危机。
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Supreme Risk
While many have discussed the social issues that might arise because of a majority-conservative Supreme Court, one critical consequence of the current Supreme Court has been overlooked: the role of the Supreme Court in generating or avoiding systemic risk. For some time, systemic financial risk has been regulated by a mix of self-regulatory organizations (SROs), such as the Depository Trust Corporation, and federal regulators such as the Financial Stability Oversight Council. However, the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence now creates real risk that federal courts will declare keystone SROs unconstitutional because they do not fit neatly into an eighteenth-century constitutional framework. SROs are under-appreciated regulatory entities comprised of industry members regulating their own industries with deferential oversight from federal administrative agencies. While ordinary civics discussions entirely omit SROs, they play a critical legal and economic roles and exercise enormous power delegated to them by the federal government. Yet as nominally private entities, they enforce federal law and their own rules without abiding by the restrictions imposed on governmental entities, such as providing due process. This article makes three contributions to the literatures in financial regulation and constitutional law—disciplines which rarely interact. First, it provides a detailed account of how SROs became functionally integrated into the federal government and serve as federal law enforcement and regulators. Second, it shows how four different constitutional doctrines, now resurging under a conservative-majority Supreme Court, pose existential threats to existing SRO models. Third, the Article explains how Supreme Court decisions declaring SROs unconstitutional or limiting their powers generate systemic risk and may trigger a financial crisis.
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