众筹中的欺诈与反欺诈保险

T. Li
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引用次数: 3

摘要

美国证券交易委员会应根据《Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act》要求众筹发行人根据《证券法》第4A(c)条,使用董事和高级管理人员责任保险模式,获得私人责任保险。反欺诈担忧可能是SEC拖延众筹规则制定的一个主要原因,因为SEC必须在投资者保护与披露成本之间取得平衡。为了解决这些问题,私人保险模式可以通过市场来确定发行人的“股东诉讼风险现值”,从而将众筹欺诈的成本分摊给发行人。最高赔偿金额将以众筹产品的金额为上限,根据拟议的保险计划,任何赔偿都需要根据第4A(c)条提供诉因证明。
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Fraud in Crowdfunding and Antifraud Insurance
The SEC should require crowdfunding issuers under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act to obtain private insurance against liability based on Section 4A(c) of the Securities Act, using a model of Directors & Officers’ liability insurance. Antifraud concerns could be a major reason for SEC holdup on crowdfunding rulemaking because the SEC must balance investor protection against the costs of disclosure. To address these concerns, a private insurance model could spread the costs of fraud in crowdfunding across the issuers by using the market to determine the “present value of shareholder litigation risk” for that issuer. The maximum recovery would be capped by the amount of the crowdfunding offering, and any recovery under the proposed insurance plan would require proof of a cause of action under Section 4A(c).
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