并购控制中的强制与威慑:以并购救济为例

IF 0.4 Q3 LAW Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2018-11-27 DOI:10.1515/rle-2015-0014
Andreea Cosnita‐Langlais, Lars Sørgard
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引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要本文研究了在存在救济的情况下并购控制的执行,并研究了并购救济如何影响控制并购所实现的威慑。我们确定了该机构发起调查的最佳频率,并发现当有条件批准成为可能时,可能更难阻止最不利于福利的合并,并且该机构可能不得不更频繁地调查合并。此外,我们发现补救措施很可能会降低福利。最后,我们表明我们的理论结果有助于理解文献中的一些实证发现。
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Enforcement and Deterrence in Merger Control: The Case of Merger Remedies
Abstract This paper deals with the enforcement of merger control in the presence of remedies, and studies how merger remedies affect the deterrence accomplished by controlling mergers. We determine the optimal frequency of investigations launched by the agency, and find that when conditional approvals are possible, it may be harder to deter the most welfare-detrimental mergers, and the agency might have to investigate mergers more often. Furthermore, we find that remedies may very well decrease welfare. Finally, we show that our theoretical results help to understand some of the empirical findings in the literature.
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CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
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