{"title":"并购控制中的强制与威慑:以并购救济为例","authors":"Andreea Cosnita‐Langlais, Lars Sørgard","doi":"10.1515/rle-2015-0014","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper deals with the enforcement of merger control in the presence of remedies, and studies how merger remedies affect the deterrence accomplished by controlling mergers. We determine the optimal frequency of investigations launched by the agency, and find that when conditional approvals are possible, it may be harder to deter the most welfare-detrimental mergers, and the agency might have to investigate mergers more often. Furthermore, we find that remedies may very well decrease welfare. Finally, we show that our theoretical results help to understand some of the empirical findings in the literature.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2018-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Enforcement and Deterrence in Merger Control: The Case of Merger Remedies\",\"authors\":\"Andreea Cosnita‐Langlais, Lars Sørgard\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/rle-2015-0014\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract This paper deals with the enforcement of merger control in the presence of remedies, and studies how merger remedies affect the deterrence accomplished by controlling mergers. We determine the optimal frequency of investigations launched by the agency, and find that when conditional approvals are possible, it may be harder to deter the most welfare-detrimental mergers, and the agency might have to investigate mergers more often. Furthermore, we find that remedies may very well decrease welfare. Finally, we show that our theoretical results help to understand some of the empirical findings in the literature.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44795,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Review of Law & Economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-11-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Review of Law & Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2015-0014\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Law & Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2015-0014","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
Enforcement and Deterrence in Merger Control: The Case of Merger Remedies
Abstract This paper deals with the enforcement of merger control in the presence of remedies, and studies how merger remedies affect the deterrence accomplished by controlling mergers. We determine the optimal frequency of investigations launched by the agency, and find that when conditional approvals are possible, it may be harder to deter the most welfare-detrimental mergers, and the agency might have to investigate mergers more often. Furthermore, we find that remedies may very well decrease welfare. Finally, we show that our theoretical results help to understand some of the empirical findings in the literature.