赞助、比赛和政治奖励:来自中国模范县委书记的证据

IF 2.6 3区 管理学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Pub Date : 2023-08-22 DOI:10.1111/gove.12817
Wenchi Wei, Wen Xu, Wenzhao Li
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究的重点是模范县委书记这一荣誉,这是中国共产党为表彰优秀县委书记而授予的一项殊荣。具体而言,我们研究了县委书记与高级政治家的赞助网络以及与其他政治竞争者相比的相对经济表现如何影响他们获得这一荣誉的可能性。我们从各种官方文件和网络资料中收集了 2000 多名县委书记的人口和履历数据。工具变量估计结果表明,与锦标赛理论一致,县委书记相对经济表现的提高会增加他们获得这一荣誉的可能性。然而,县级领导与高级政治家的赞助网络对经济表现的估计影响具有负向调节作用。这一发现与赞助理论的推论相矛盾,但支持了高级政治家可能利用赞助网络在政治上压制下级领导人并防止政治不确定性的猜想。
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Patronage, tournament, and political reward: Evidence from the model county party secretary in China

This study focuses on the honor of Model County Party Secretary, a prestigious award bestowed by the Communist Party of China to recognize exceptional county party secretaries. Specifically, we investigate how county party secretaries' patronage networks with senior politicians and their relative economic performance compared to other political contestants can impact their likelihood of winning this honor. We collect demographic and biographic data on a sample of over 2000 county party secretaries from various official documents and online sources. Instrumental variable estimations show that, in line with tournament theory, an increase in county party secretaries' relative economic performance enhances their likelihood of receiving the honor. However, county leaders' patronage networks with senior politicians negatively moderate the estimated impact of economic performance. This finding contradicts the inference drawn from patronage theory but supports the conjecture that senior politicians may exploit patronage networks to politically suppress subordinate leaders and prevent political uncertainty.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.70
自引率
10.30%
发文量
91
期刊介绍: Governance provides a forum for the theoretical and practical discussion of executive politics, public policy, administration, and the organization of the state. Published in association with International Political Science Association''s Research Committee on the Structure & Organization of Government (SOG), it emphasizes peer-reviewed articles that take an international or comparative approach to public policy and administration. All papers, regardless of empirical focus, should have wider theoretical, comparative, or practical significance.
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