深思熟虑与话语不公正:集体失败。

Moisés Barba
{"title":"深思熟虑与话语不公正:集体失败。","authors":"Moisés Barba","doi":"10.5209/ltdl.77037","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to expand the theoretical field of discursive injustice by identifying a specific kind of discursive injustice, namely, the kind we are subject to when we are unjustly prevented from exchanging reasons with others. Broadly speaking, discursive injustice is the kind of injustice we suffer when we are unjustly harmed as language users, most notably when we are prevented from using language in ways we are entitled to. The dominant approach to discursive injustice has focused on the corruption of the illocutionary force of a speech act due to the hearer’s improper uptake. I claim that there is a genuinely distinct kind of discursive injustice, which I label as deliberative injustice, that cannot be accounted for by the dominant approach to discursive injustice. In my view, what makes deliberative injustice discursively unjust is that it amounts to denying someone a normative position that she is entitled to as a language user, which I understand in terms of being a source of reasons. Moreover, I explore two ways of trying to illuminate deliberative injustice by appealing to the social level of analysis, namely, by resorting to a structural explanation (Ayala, 2018) to explain how it comes about, and by asking what it signifies for the collective life of groups. In this regard, I show that the structural explanation has some explanatory limitations, and that deliberative injustice essentially constitutes a collective failure.","PeriodicalId":40567,"journal":{"name":"Torres de Lucca-Revista Internacional de Filosofia Politica","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2022-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Deliberation and Discursive Injustice: A Collective Failure.\",\"authors\":\"Moisés Barba\",\"doi\":\"10.5209/ltdl.77037\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The purpose of this paper is to expand the theoretical field of discursive injustice by identifying a specific kind of discursive injustice, namely, the kind we are subject to when we are unjustly prevented from exchanging reasons with others. Broadly speaking, discursive injustice is the kind of injustice we suffer when we are unjustly harmed as language users, most notably when we are prevented from using language in ways we are entitled to. The dominant approach to discursive injustice has focused on the corruption of the illocutionary force of a speech act due to the hearer’s improper uptake. I claim that there is a genuinely distinct kind of discursive injustice, which I label as deliberative injustice, that cannot be accounted for by the dominant approach to discursive injustice. In my view, what makes deliberative injustice discursively unjust is that it amounts to denying someone a normative position that she is entitled to as a language user, which I understand in terms of being a source of reasons. Moreover, I explore two ways of trying to illuminate deliberative injustice by appealing to the social level of analysis, namely, by resorting to a structural explanation (Ayala, 2018) to explain how it comes about, and by asking what it signifies for the collective life of groups. In this regard, I show that the structural explanation has some explanatory limitations, and that deliberative injustice essentially constitutes a collective failure.\",\"PeriodicalId\":40567,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Torres de Lucca-Revista Internacional de Filosofia Politica\",\"volume\":\"27 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-06-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Torres de Lucca-Revista Internacional de Filosofia Politica\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5209/ltdl.77037\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Torres de Lucca-Revista Internacional de Filosofia Politica","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5209/ltdl.77037","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本文的目的是通过识别一种特定的话语不公正,即当我们被不公正地阻止与他人交换理由时,我们所遭受的那种话语不公正,来扩大话语不公正的理论领域。广义地说,话语不公正是当我们作为语言使用者受到不公正的伤害时所遭受的那种不公正,尤其是当我们被禁止以我们有权使用的方式使用语言时。话语不公正的主要研究方法集中在由于听者不恰当的理解而导致言语行为的言外力量的腐化。我认为有一种真正独特的话语性不公正,我将其称为审慎的不公正,它不能用话语性不公正的主流方法来解释。在我看来,审慎的不公正之所以是话语上的不公正,是因为它等于否认某人作为语言使用者有权享有的规范地位,我认为这是原因的来源。此外,我探索了两种方式,试图通过诉诸社会层面的分析来阐明审慎的不公正,即通过诉诸结构性解释(Ayala, 2018)来解释它是如何产生的,并通过询问它对群体的集体生活意味着什么。在这方面,我指出结构解释有一些解释上的局限性,而且蓄意的不公正基本上构成了集体失败。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Deliberation and Discursive Injustice: A Collective Failure.
The purpose of this paper is to expand the theoretical field of discursive injustice by identifying a specific kind of discursive injustice, namely, the kind we are subject to when we are unjustly prevented from exchanging reasons with others. Broadly speaking, discursive injustice is the kind of injustice we suffer when we are unjustly harmed as language users, most notably when we are prevented from using language in ways we are entitled to. The dominant approach to discursive injustice has focused on the corruption of the illocutionary force of a speech act due to the hearer’s improper uptake. I claim that there is a genuinely distinct kind of discursive injustice, which I label as deliberative injustice, that cannot be accounted for by the dominant approach to discursive injustice. In my view, what makes deliberative injustice discursively unjust is that it amounts to denying someone a normative position that she is entitled to as a language user, which I understand in terms of being a source of reasons. Moreover, I explore two ways of trying to illuminate deliberative injustice by appealing to the social level of analysis, namely, by resorting to a structural explanation (Ayala, 2018) to explain how it comes about, and by asking what it signifies for the collective life of groups. In this regard, I show that the structural explanation has some explanatory limitations, and that deliberative injustice essentially constitutes a collective failure.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
37
审稿时长
22 weeks
期刊介绍: The scientific scope of Las Torres de Lucca (International Journal of Political Philosophy) will be to comprehend the characteristics of political philosophy, in line with the interdisciplinary character that has operated in this field during the last several years. We welcome contributions from the areas traditionally linked directly to political philosophy (moral philosophy, philosophy of law, political theory), as well as from those that have been incorporated up to the present day (political economy, philosophy of history, psychology, neurophysiology and, to a lesser extent, other sciences) as long as their scope is focused on the treatment of public affairs and sheds light on contemporary political reflections. In the same way, the reference to classic problems should be brought to bear on contemporary questions. The journal does not commit itself to any school of thought, style or ideology. However, we do commit ourselves to argumentative rigor and expositive clarity. Thus, the new publication is directed towards the academic environment and designed for the specialized reader; but the publication also aspires to awake interest in the reader who is not technically formed in these disciplines, but is interested by the public questions that inevitably affect him or her. We expect that the scope of the journal will be international. Thus, articles will be published in Spanish and English, and original articles in French, Portuguese, Italian, or German will be accepted as exceptions (depending on their quality and relevance), translated into Spanish and published in a bilingual format. We are particularly interested in covering the Spanish/Latin American realm, particularly lacking in specialized publications of this type. With this in mind, we count on experts from the distinct countries included in this geographic area.
期刊最新文献
Introducción. La guerra entre política, ética y arte militar en Maquiavelo ¿Qué queda para la crítica? Sobre los peligros de la inocencia en tiempos neoliberales “Armas propias” y maquiavelismo militar: con algunas notas sobre el concepto de autor en la tratadística del siglo XV. Armi proprie” e machiavellismo militare: con alcune note sul concetto di “autore” nella trattatistica del Cinquecento Gamero Cabrera, Isabel (2021). La paradoja de Habermas. ¿Qué sucede cuando se aplica la teoría de la acción comunicativa a debates actuales? Dado Ediciones. 325 pp.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1