因果归因、利益分享与盈余管理

Lukas J. Helikum, H. Tan, Tu Xu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们进行了两个实验来检验盈余管理的两个证明因素的联合效应,即公司业绩不佳的归因和夸大报告盈余给其他员工带来的利益。在主实验中,我们预测并发现,当公司的业绩不佳是由外部事件引起的,并且误报的盈余使报告经理以外的其他员工受益时,管理者更有可能管理盈余。此外,我们表明,参与者使用道德辩护的程度中介了利益分享对盈余管理的影响,但仅当因果归因是外部的;它中介了因果归因对盈余管理的影响,但仅当利益是共享的。在第二个实验中,我们使用了一个没有提及因果归因或利益分享的中性控制条件来证明,相对于管理者在没有明确提及任何一个因素的情况下通常所做的事情,这两个证明因素共同增加了盈余管理。我们通过提出和测试一个解释多重理由因素如何相互作用导致机会主义行为的理论,为会计和心理学文献做出了贡献。我们的研究结果对实践具有重要意义。
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Causal Attribution, Benefits Sharing, and Earnings Management
We conduct two experiments to examine the joint effect of two justification factors of earnings management, namely attribution for the firm’s underperformance and benefits accruing to other employees from inflating reported earnings. In the main experiment, we predict and find that managers are more likely to manage earnings when the firm’s underperformance is caused by an external event and misreported earnings benefit other employees besides the reporting manager. Further, we show that the extent to which participants use moral justifications mediates the effect of benefits sharing on earnings management, but only when causal attribution is external, and that it mediates the effect of causal attribution on earnings management, but only when benefits are shared. In the second experiment, we use a neutral control condition that makes no mention of causal attribution or benefits sharing to demonstrate that both justification factors jointly increase earnings management relative to what managers normally do in a situation without an explicit mention of either factor. We contribute to the accounting and psychology literature by proposing and testing a theory that explains how multiple justification factors interact to cause opportunistic behavior. Our results have important implications for practice.
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