{"title":"模拟宣言:蛮力经验主义在地缘政治预测中的局限性","authors":"Ian S. Lustick, Philip E. Tetlock","doi":"10.1002/ffo2.64","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Intelligence analysis has traditionally relied on inside-view, case-specific modes of thinking: why did this actor—say, the USSR—do that and what might it do next? After 9/11, however, analysts faced a vastly wider range of threats that necessitated outside-view, statistical modes of reasoning: how likely are threats to emerge from actors of diverse types operating in situations of diverse types? Area-study specialists (who staffed most geopolitical desks) were ill-equipped for answering these questions. Thanks to advances in long-range sensing, digitization, and computing, the intelligence community was flooded with data, but lacked clear ideas about how to render it relevant. Empiricism, whether grounded in deep inside-view knowledge of particular places or broad outside-view knowledge of statistical patterns across the globe, could not and cannot solve the problem of anticipating high-impact, rare events, like sneak attacks and pandemics. Contingency planning for these threats requires well-calibrated conditional forecasts of the impact of policy interventions that in turn require synthesizing inside- and outside-view analytics. Such syntheses will be best achieved by refining computer simulations that permit replays of history based on the interplay among initial conditions, chance, and social-science models of causation. We offer suggestions for accelerating the development and application of theory-guided simulation techniques.</p>","PeriodicalId":100567,"journal":{"name":"FUTURES & FORESIGHT SCIENCE","volume":"3 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/ffo2.64","citationCount":"15","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The simulation manifesto: The limits of brute-force empiricism in geopolitical forecasting\",\"authors\":\"Ian S. Lustick, Philip E. Tetlock\",\"doi\":\"10.1002/ffo2.64\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Intelligence analysis has traditionally relied on inside-view, case-specific modes of thinking: why did this actor—say, the USSR—do that and what might it do next? After 9/11, however, analysts faced a vastly wider range of threats that necessitated outside-view, statistical modes of reasoning: how likely are threats to emerge from actors of diverse types operating in situations of diverse types? Area-study specialists (who staffed most geopolitical desks) were ill-equipped for answering these questions. Thanks to advances in long-range sensing, digitization, and computing, the intelligence community was flooded with data, but lacked clear ideas about how to render it relevant. Empiricism, whether grounded in deep inside-view knowledge of particular places or broad outside-view knowledge of statistical patterns across the globe, could not and cannot solve the problem of anticipating high-impact, rare events, like sneak attacks and pandemics. Contingency planning for these threats requires well-calibrated conditional forecasts of the impact of policy interventions that in turn require synthesizing inside- and outside-view analytics. Such syntheses will be best achieved by refining computer simulations that permit replays of history based on the interplay among initial conditions, chance, and social-science models of causation. We offer suggestions for accelerating the development and application of theory-guided simulation techniques.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":100567,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"FUTURES & FORESIGHT SCIENCE\",\"volume\":\"3 2\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-02-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/ffo2.64\",\"citationCount\":\"15\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"FUTURES & FORESIGHT SCIENCE\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ffo2.64\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"FUTURES & FORESIGHT SCIENCE","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ffo2.64","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The simulation manifesto: The limits of brute-force empiricism in geopolitical forecasting
Intelligence analysis has traditionally relied on inside-view, case-specific modes of thinking: why did this actor—say, the USSR—do that and what might it do next? After 9/11, however, analysts faced a vastly wider range of threats that necessitated outside-view, statistical modes of reasoning: how likely are threats to emerge from actors of diverse types operating in situations of diverse types? Area-study specialists (who staffed most geopolitical desks) were ill-equipped for answering these questions. Thanks to advances in long-range sensing, digitization, and computing, the intelligence community was flooded with data, but lacked clear ideas about how to render it relevant. Empiricism, whether grounded in deep inside-view knowledge of particular places or broad outside-view knowledge of statistical patterns across the globe, could not and cannot solve the problem of anticipating high-impact, rare events, like sneak attacks and pandemics. Contingency planning for these threats requires well-calibrated conditional forecasts of the impact of policy interventions that in turn require synthesizing inside- and outside-view analytics. Such syntheses will be best achieved by refining computer simulations that permit replays of history based on the interplay among initial conditions, chance, and social-science models of causation. We offer suggestions for accelerating the development and application of theory-guided simulation techniques.