来自内幕交易的投资情报

E. Miller
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The federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines \"insider\" in two ways, one of which says insiders are high-level corporate executives, board members, or stockholders with over 10% ownership in the company. Insiders of this kind are forbidden from benefiting from any positions held for less than six months, and anyone in possession of material, non-public information (the other definition of \"insider\") is forbidden from trading in the firm's securities while having such information. To enforce these regulations, insiders of the first type are required to report their trading of the stocks for which they are insiders within 10 days of the month's close to the Securities and Exchange Commission, which then makes it public. Seyhun combines this data with other stock market data to also report on the profitability of investment rules involving such measures as priceearnings ratios, book-to-market ratios, take-overs, and trends in prices. In Seyhun's study, insider trading in a particular company is first aggregated by months, with a month where the insiders bought more shares than they sold defined as a buying month, and one in which they sold more than they bought being defined as a selling month. This resulted in 144,884 buy months and 164,309 sell months, making this a large database. The surplus of selling is probably because the category of insider includes many who started firms (or got in early), and who afterwards tend to be net sellers. Since most insiders have the bulk of their wealth in their company, standard financial advice would be to diversify (which of course is legal). It should be noted that much insider trading is for such legitimate purposes as diversification and personal liquidity. It is also legal for insiders to make trades based on public information (if, at the time, they have no inside material information). Of course, given their concentrated position and incentive to keep up-to-date on their companies, insiders may be better able to evaluate and use the public information. While it is illegal for insiders to trade on material, non-public information, it is legal to refrain from trading on the basis of material, non-public information, a point Seyhun does not make. To illustrate, consider an individual who has a substantial position in a company (perhaps from being a founder, or from having exercised many options). Having little invested outside of this company, he decides to diversify his investments by selling a portion every quarter, carefully timed so that he is not selling when he has material, non-public information (such as an unusually bad forthcoming earning announcement). This is a very sensible, rational policy most financial planners would approve of, Now suppose this insider receives non-public information that the company's earnings will be unusually good this quarter (or even that the company is negotiating to be taken over at a big premium). The insider is legally free to cancel his planned (but probably unrevealed) sales, making them later when the price is likely to be higher. Since he has used his insider information not to trade at a profit, but to avoid trading when he had material information, he has not engaged in illegal insider trading, although he has still benefited from his inside information. …","PeriodicalId":52486,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1999-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"167","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading\",\"authors\":\"E. Miller\",\"doi\":\"10.5860/choice.36-4599\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A recent book analyzing a large database about \\\"insider trading\\\" as reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission gives valuable insights into what can be learned, by investors and market analysts, from the buying and selling done by insiders. 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In Seyhun's study, insider trading in a particular company is first aggregated by months, with a month where the insiders bought more shares than they sold defined as a buying month, and one in which they sold more than they bought being defined as a selling month. This resulted in 144,884 buy months and 164,309 sell months, making this a large database. The surplus of selling is probably because the category of insider includes many who started firms (or got in early), and who afterwards tend to be net sellers. Since most insiders have the bulk of their wealth in their company, standard financial advice would be to diversify (which of course is legal). It should be noted that much insider trading is for such legitimate purposes as diversification and personal liquidity. It is also legal for insiders to make trades based on public information (if, at the time, they have no inside material information). Of course, given their concentrated position and incentive to keep up-to-date on their companies, insiders may be better able to evaluate and use the public information. While it is illegal for insiders to trade on material, non-public information, it is legal to refrain from trading on the basis of material, non-public information, a point Seyhun does not make. To illustrate, consider an individual who has a substantial position in a company (perhaps from being a founder, or from having exercised many options). Having little invested outside of this company, he decides to diversify his investments by selling a portion every quarter, carefully timed so that he is not selling when he has material, non-public information (such as an unusually bad forthcoming earning announcement). 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引用次数: 167

摘要

最近有一本书分析了向美国证券交易委员会(Securities and Exchange Commission)报告的一个关于“内幕交易”的大型数据库,就投资者和市场分析师可以从内幕交易中学到什么提供了有价值的见解。在本文中,报告了该书的结果,并添加了关于其含义的评论。关键词:内幕交易,投资者市场指标,内部人市场行为,证券市场预测统计研究H. Neyjats Seyhun的《来自内幕交易的投资情报》(MIT出版社,1998)报告了对1973年至1994年内幕交易统计数据预测美国股票回报能力的大规模研究。股市投资者和金融经济学家都应该对此感兴趣。1934年的《联邦证券交易法》(Securities Exchange Act)从两方面定义了“内部人”,其中一种说法是,内部人是公司高管、董事会成员或持有公司10%以上股权的股东。此类内部人员被禁止从持有时间少于6个月的任何头寸中获利,任何拥有重大非公开信息(“内部人员”的另一种定义)的人被禁止在获得此类信息时交易公司的证券。为了执行这些规定,第一类内幕人士必须在当月收盘后10天内向美国证券交易委员会(Securities and Exchange Commission)报告其所持股票的交易情况,后者随后将其公之于众。Seyhun将这些数据与其他股市数据结合起来,报告投资规则的盈利能力,包括市盈率、账面市值比、收购和价格趋势等指标。在Seyhun的研究中,某家公司的内幕交易首先按月汇总,当一个月内部人士买进多于卖出的股票被定义为买入月份,当一个月内部人士卖出多于买入的股票被定义为卖出月份。这产生了144,884个买入月和164,309个卖出月,使其成为一个大型数据库。抛售的过剩可能是因为内部人士包括许多创业(或早期进入)的人,他们后来往往是净卖家。由于大多数内部人士的大部分财富都在公司,标准的理财建议是分散投资(这当然是合法的)。应该指出的是,许多内幕交易都是出于多样化和个人流动性等合法目的。内部人士根据公开信息进行交易也是合法的(如果当时他们没有内部重大信息)。当然,考虑到他们的集中地位和保持公司最新动态的动机,内部人士可能更有能力评估和利用公开信息。虽然内部人利用重大的、非公开的信息进行交易是违法的,但不利用重大的、非公开的信息进行交易是合法的,这一点赛勋没有提到。为了说明这一点,考虑一个在公司中拥有重要职位的人(可能是创始人,或者行使了许多期权)。由于在这家公司之外的投资很少,他决定分散投资,每季度出售一部分,并仔细选择时机,这样他就不会在有重大的非公开信息(比如即将发布的异常糟糕的盈利公告)时出售。这是一项非常明智、理性的政策,大多数财务规划师都会赞成。现在,假设这位内部人士得到的非公开信息是,该公司本季度的收益将异乎寻常地好(甚至是该公司正在就以高额溢价被收购进行谈判)。在法律上,内部人士可以自由地取消他计划中的(但可能没有透露的)销售,在价格可能更高的时候推迟销售。由于其利用内幕信息的目的不是为了牟利,而是为了避免在掌握重大信息时进行交易,因此,尽管他仍然从内幕信息中获益,但他并未从事非法内幕交易。...
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Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading
A recent book analyzing a large database about "insider trading" as reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission gives valuable insights into what can be learned, by investors and market analysts, from the buying and selling done by insiders. In this article, the book's results are reported, and commentary is added about the implications. Key Words: Insider trading, market indicators for investors, H. Ne)jats Seyhun, insiders' market behavior, statistical studies to predict securities market. H. Neyjats Seyhun's Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading (MIT Press, 1998) reports on a massive study of the ability of statistics on insider trading from 1973 to 1994 to predict U.S. stock returns. It should be of interest to both stock market investors and financial economists. The federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines "insider" in two ways, one of which says insiders are high-level corporate executives, board members, or stockholders with over 10% ownership in the company. Insiders of this kind are forbidden from benefiting from any positions held for less than six months, and anyone in possession of material, non-public information (the other definition of "insider") is forbidden from trading in the firm's securities while having such information. To enforce these regulations, insiders of the first type are required to report their trading of the stocks for which they are insiders within 10 days of the month's close to the Securities and Exchange Commission, which then makes it public. Seyhun combines this data with other stock market data to also report on the profitability of investment rules involving such measures as priceearnings ratios, book-to-market ratios, take-overs, and trends in prices. In Seyhun's study, insider trading in a particular company is first aggregated by months, with a month where the insiders bought more shares than they sold defined as a buying month, and one in which they sold more than they bought being defined as a selling month. This resulted in 144,884 buy months and 164,309 sell months, making this a large database. The surplus of selling is probably because the category of insider includes many who started firms (or got in early), and who afterwards tend to be net sellers. Since most insiders have the bulk of their wealth in their company, standard financial advice would be to diversify (which of course is legal). It should be noted that much insider trading is for such legitimate purposes as diversification and personal liquidity. It is also legal for insiders to make trades based on public information (if, at the time, they have no inside material information). Of course, given their concentrated position and incentive to keep up-to-date on their companies, insiders may be better able to evaluate and use the public information. While it is illegal for insiders to trade on material, non-public information, it is legal to refrain from trading on the basis of material, non-public information, a point Seyhun does not make. To illustrate, consider an individual who has a substantial position in a company (perhaps from being a founder, or from having exercised many options). Having little invested outside of this company, he decides to diversify his investments by selling a portion every quarter, carefully timed so that he is not selling when he has material, non-public information (such as an unusually bad forthcoming earning announcement). This is a very sensible, rational policy most financial planners would approve of, Now suppose this insider receives non-public information that the company's earnings will be unusually good this quarter (or even that the company is negotiating to be taken over at a big premium). The insider is legally free to cancel his planned (but probably unrevealed) sales, making them later when the price is likely to be higher. Since he has used his insider information not to trade at a profit, but to avoid trading when he had material information, he has not engaged in illegal insider trading, although he has still benefited from his inside information. …
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Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies
Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
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期刊介绍: The quarterly Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies (ISSN 0193-5941), which has been published regularly since 1976, is a peer-reviewed academic journal devoted to scholarly papers which present in depth information on contemporary issues of primarily international interest. The emphasis is on factual information rather than purely theoretical or historical papers, although it welcomes an historical approach to contemporary situations where this serves to clarify the causal background to present day problems.
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