Francis Akowuah, Romesh Prasad, Carlos Omar Espinoza, Fanxin Kong
{"title":"学习恢复:从传感器攻击中恢复自主网络物理系统","authors":"Francis Akowuah, Romesh Prasad, Carlos Omar Espinoza, Fanxin Kong","doi":"10.1109/RTCSA52859.2021.00015","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Autonomous cyber-physical systems (CPS) are susceptible to non-invasive physical attacks such as sensor spoofing attacks that are beyond the classical cybersecurity domain. These attacks have motivated numerous research efforts on attack detection, but little attention on what to do after detecting an attack. The importance of attack recovery is emphasized by the need to mitigate the attack’s impact on a system and restore it to continue functioning. There are only a few works addressing attack recovery, but they all rely on prior knowledge of system dynamics. To overcome this limitation, we propose Recovery-by-Learning, a data-driven attack recovery framework that restores CPS from sensor attacks. The framework leverages natural redundancy among heterogeneous sensors and historical data for attack recovery. Specially, the framework consists of two major components: state predictor and data checkpointer. First, the predictor is triggered to estimate systems states after the detection of an attack. We propose a deep learning-based prediction model that exploits the temporal correlation among heterogeneous sensors. Second, the checkpointer executes when no attack is detected. We propose a double sliding window based checkpointing protocol to remove compromised data and keep trustful data as input to the state predictor. Third, we implement and evaluate the effectiveness of our framework using a realistic data set and a ground vehicle simulator. The results show that our method restores a system to continue functioning in presence of sensor attacks.","PeriodicalId":38446,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Embedded and Real-Time Communication Systems (IJERTCS)","volume":"46 1","pages":"61-66"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Recovery-by-Learning: Restoring Autonomous Cyber-physical Systems from Sensor Attacks\",\"authors\":\"Francis Akowuah, Romesh Prasad, Carlos Omar Espinoza, Fanxin Kong\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/RTCSA52859.2021.00015\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Autonomous cyber-physical systems (CPS) are susceptible to non-invasive physical attacks such as sensor spoofing attacks that are beyond the classical cybersecurity domain. These attacks have motivated numerous research efforts on attack detection, but little attention on what to do after detecting an attack. The importance of attack recovery is emphasized by the need to mitigate the attack’s impact on a system and restore it to continue functioning. There are only a few works addressing attack recovery, but they all rely on prior knowledge of system dynamics. To overcome this limitation, we propose Recovery-by-Learning, a data-driven attack recovery framework that restores CPS from sensor attacks. The framework leverages natural redundancy among heterogeneous sensors and historical data for attack recovery. Specially, the framework consists of two major components: state predictor and data checkpointer. First, the predictor is triggered to estimate systems states after the detection of an attack. We propose a deep learning-based prediction model that exploits the temporal correlation among heterogeneous sensors. Second, the checkpointer executes when no attack is detected. We propose a double sliding window based checkpointing protocol to remove compromised data and keep trustful data as input to the state predictor. Third, we implement and evaluate the effectiveness of our framework using a realistic data set and a ground vehicle simulator. The results show that our method restores a system to continue functioning in presence of sensor attacks.\",\"PeriodicalId\":38446,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Embedded and Real-Time Communication Systems (IJERTCS)\",\"volume\":\"46 1\",\"pages\":\"61-66\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Embedded and Real-Time Communication Systems (IJERTCS)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/RTCSA52859.2021.00015\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Embedded and Real-Time Communication Systems (IJERTCS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/RTCSA52859.2021.00015","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING","Score":null,"Total":0}
Recovery-by-Learning: Restoring Autonomous Cyber-physical Systems from Sensor Attacks
Autonomous cyber-physical systems (CPS) are susceptible to non-invasive physical attacks such as sensor spoofing attacks that are beyond the classical cybersecurity domain. These attacks have motivated numerous research efforts on attack detection, but little attention on what to do after detecting an attack. The importance of attack recovery is emphasized by the need to mitigate the attack’s impact on a system and restore it to continue functioning. There are only a few works addressing attack recovery, but they all rely on prior knowledge of system dynamics. To overcome this limitation, we propose Recovery-by-Learning, a data-driven attack recovery framework that restores CPS from sensor attacks. The framework leverages natural redundancy among heterogeneous sensors and historical data for attack recovery. Specially, the framework consists of two major components: state predictor and data checkpointer. First, the predictor is triggered to estimate systems states after the detection of an attack. We propose a deep learning-based prediction model that exploits the temporal correlation among heterogeneous sensors. Second, the checkpointer executes when no attack is detected. We propose a double sliding window based checkpointing protocol to remove compromised data and keep trustful data as input to the state predictor. Third, we implement and evaluate the effectiveness of our framework using a realistic data set and a ground vehicle simulator. The results show that our method restores a system to continue functioning in presence of sensor attacks.