地位较高的人的战略性剥削招致更严厉的第三方惩罚

IF 1.2 4区 心理学 Q4 PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL Social Psychology Pub Date : 2022-07-01 DOI:10.1027/1864-9335/a000493
Mengchen Dong, Jan‐Willem van Prooijen, P. V. van Lange
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要广泛的文件表明,第三方惩罚违反规范的行为,即使付出巨大代价也在所不惜。然而,在由地位不同的成员组成的群体中,第三方惩罚是如何发生的,我们知之甚少。拥有一个地位较高的成员可以促进规范的执行和团队效率,但当他们战略性地利用人们的信任来最大化自身利益时,也会对集体利益构成威胁。两项预先登记的研究一致表明,惩罚机制取决于目标地位和战略利用。当地位高而不是地位低的目标在公开支持合作(研究1)或程序公平(研究2)后违规时,第三方观察者会产生更严厉的惩罚。研究结果阐明了第三方惩罚是一种可行的机制,可以在地位不对称的互动中抵消剥削和维持社会规范。
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Strategic Exploitation by Higher-Status People Incurs Harsher Third-Party Punishment
Abstract. It is widely documented that third parties punish norm violations, even at a substantial cost to themselves. However, little is known about how third-party punishment occurs in groups consisting of members who differ in status. Having a higher-status member promotes norm enforcement and group efficiency but also poses threats to collective goods when they strategically exploit people’s trust to maximize self-interest. Two preregistered studies consistently revealed a punitive mechanism contingent on target status and strategic exploitation. Third-party observers generated harsher punishment when high- but not low-status targets transgressed after publicly endorsing cooperation (Study 1) or procedural fairness (Study 2). The findings elucidate third-party punishment as a feasible mechanism to counteract exploitation and maintain social norms in interactions with status asymmetry.
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来源期刊
Social Psychology
Social Psychology PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL-
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
22
期刊最新文献
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