零许可声学跨设备跟踪

Nikolay Matyunin, Jakub Szefer, S. Katzenbeisser
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引用次数: 9

摘要

如今,攻击者可以将跟踪标识符嵌入超声波中,并在用户没有意识到的情况下在设备之间秘密传输。为了防止此类新出现的隐私风险,移动应用程序现在需要在运行时请求明确的用户许可,才能访问设备的麦克风。然而,在本文中,我们表明,目前的防御是不够的。我们介绍了一种新的声学跨设备跟踪方法,该方法不需要麦克风访问,而是利用MEMS陀螺仪对特定(超声波)频率的声学振动的敏感性。目前,访问陀螺仪的数据不需要任何权限,陀螺仪可以从应用程序甚至从web浏览器访问。通过这种方式,现代智能手机和智能手表中的陀螺仪可以用作超声波信号的零许可接收器,使用户完全察觉不到跨设备跟踪。我们在几个使用不同音频硬件的移动设备上评估了我们的方法,在现实攻击场景中,在35cm到16m的距离上实现了10-20bit /s的传输带宽。最后,我们讨论了针对所提出的攻击的潜在对策。
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Zero-permission acoustic cross-device tracking
Adversaries today can embed tracking identifiers into ultrasonic sound and covertly transmit them between devices without users realizing that this is happening. To prevent such emerging privacy risks, mobile applications now require a request for an explicit user permission, at run-time, to get access to a device's microphone. In this paper, however, we show that current defenses are not enough. We introduce a novel approach to acoustic cross-device tracking, which does not require microphone access, but instead exploits the susceptibility of MEMS gyroscopes to acoustic vibrations at specific (ultrasonic) frequencies. Currently, no permissions are needed to access the gyroscope's data, and the gyroscope can be accessed from apps or even from a web browser. In this manner, gyroscopes in modern smartphones and smartwatches can be used as zero-permission receivers of ultrasonic signals, making cross-device tracking completely unnoticeable to users. We evaluate our approach on several mobile devices using different audio hardware, achieving 10–20bit/s transmission bandwidth at distances from 35cm to 16m in realistic attack scenarios. Finally, we discuss potential countermeasures against the presented attack.
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