{"title":"理性评价不一致的理论","authors":"E. Weber, M. Dyck","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82147","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"What happens if one applies the “evaluation methodology” of Theo Kuipers to inconsistent theories? What happens if one applies the “problem solving methodology” of Larry Laudan to inconsistent theories? We argue that in both cases something unacceptable happens. We show that application of Kuipers‟ methodology to inconsistent theories leads to a methodological stalemate: inconsistent theories are incomparable to consistent ones. Then we show that according to Laudan‟s methodology inconsistent theories are always better than consistent ones. Finally, we offer partial solutions to these problems.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Rationally evaluating inconsistent theories\",\"authors\":\"E. Weber, M. Dyck\",\"doi\":\"10.21825/philosophica.82147\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"What happens if one applies the “evaluation methodology” of Theo Kuipers to inconsistent theories? What happens if one applies the “problem solving methodology” of Larry Laudan to inconsistent theories? We argue that in both cases something unacceptable happens. We show that application of Kuipers‟ methodology to inconsistent theories leads to a methodological stalemate: inconsistent theories are incomparable to consistent ones. Then we show that according to Laudan‟s methodology inconsistent theories are always better than consistent ones. Finally, we offer partial solutions to these problems.\",\"PeriodicalId\":36843,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Argumenta Philosophica\",\"volume\":\"11 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-01-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Argumenta Philosophica\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82147\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Argumenta Philosophica","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82147","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
What happens if one applies the “evaluation methodology” of Theo Kuipers to inconsistent theories? What happens if one applies the “problem solving methodology” of Larry Laudan to inconsistent theories? We argue that in both cases something unacceptable happens. We show that application of Kuipers‟ methodology to inconsistent theories leads to a methodological stalemate: inconsistent theories are incomparable to consistent ones. Then we show that according to Laudan‟s methodology inconsistent theories are always better than consistent ones. Finally, we offer partial solutions to these problems.