{"title":"企业债务选择与银行资本监管","authors":"Haotian Xiang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2882235","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I investigate the impact of bank capital requirements in a business cycle model with corporate debt choice. Compared to non-bank investors, banks provide restructurable loans that reduce firm bankruptcy losses and enhance production efficiency. Raising capital requirements eliminates deposit insurance distortions but also deposit tax shields. As a result, firms cut back on both bank and non-bank borrowing while going bankrupt more frequently. Implementing an optimal capital ratio of 11 percent in the US produces limited marginal impacts on aggregate quantities and welfare.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Corporate Debt Choice and Bank Capital Regulation\",\"authors\":\"Haotian Xiang\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2882235\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"I investigate the impact of bank capital requirements in a business cycle model with corporate debt choice. Compared to non-bank investors, banks provide restructurable loans that reduce firm bankruptcy losses and enhance production efficiency. Raising capital requirements eliminates deposit insurance distortions but also deposit tax shields. As a result, firms cut back on both bank and non-bank borrowing while going bankrupt more frequently. Implementing an optimal capital ratio of 11 percent in the US produces limited marginal impacts on aggregate quantities and welfare.\",\"PeriodicalId\":80976,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania\",\"volume\":\"70 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-03-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2882235\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2882235","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
I investigate the impact of bank capital requirements in a business cycle model with corporate debt choice. Compared to non-bank investors, banks provide restructurable loans that reduce firm bankruptcy losses and enhance production efficiency. Raising capital requirements eliminates deposit insurance distortions but also deposit tax shields. As a result, firms cut back on both bank and non-bank borrowing while going bankrupt more frequently. Implementing an optimal capital ratio of 11 percent in the US produces limited marginal impacts on aggregate quantities and welfare.
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