分离所有权和信息

IF 10.5 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI:10.1257/aer.20211069
P. Voss, Marius Kulms
{"title":"分离所有权和信息","authors":"P. Voss, Marius Kulms","doi":"10.1257/aer.20211069","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper identifies an upside of the separation of ownership and control, typically the source of inefficiencies in the theory of the firm. Because insiders obtain private information by exercising control, the separation of ownership and control leads to a separation of ownership and information. We show that this separation is necessary for efficient trade in the market for corporate control. The analysis reveals how strategic communication between inside and outside shareholders facilitates takeovers by eliciting external bidders’ private information. Our results call into question mandatory disclosure requirements during takeovers. (JEL D21, D82, G32, G34)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":10.5000,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Separating Ownership and Information\",\"authors\":\"P. Voss, Marius Kulms\",\"doi\":\"10.1257/aer.20211069\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper identifies an upside of the separation of ownership and control, typically the source of inefficiencies in the theory of the firm. Because insiders obtain private information by exercising control, the separation of ownership and control leads to a separation of ownership and information. We show that this separation is necessary for efficient trade in the market for corporate control. The analysis reveals how strategic communication between inside and outside shareholders facilitates takeovers by eliciting external bidders’ private information. Our results call into question mandatory disclosure requirements during takeovers. (JEL D21, D82, G32, G34)\",\"PeriodicalId\":48472,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"American Economic Review\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":10.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"American Economic Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211069\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Economic Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20211069","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

摘要

本文确定了所有权和控制权分离的一个好处,这通常是公司理论中低效的根源。由于内部人通过行使控制权获得私人信息,所有权和控制权的分离导致所有权和信息的分离。我们表明,这种分离对于公司控制权市场的有效交易是必要的。分析揭示了内外股东之间的战略沟通如何通过引出外部竞购者的私人信息来促进收购。我们的结果对收购期间的强制性披露要求提出了质疑。(凝胶d21, d82, g32, g34)
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Separating Ownership and Information
This paper identifies an upside of the separation of ownership and control, typically the source of inefficiencies in the theory of the firm. Because insiders obtain private information by exercising control, the separation of ownership and control leads to a separation of ownership and information. We show that this separation is necessary for efficient trade in the market for corporate control. The analysis reveals how strategic communication between inside and outside shareholders facilitates takeovers by eliciting external bidders’ private information. Our results call into question mandatory disclosure requirements during takeovers. (JEL D21, D82, G32, G34)
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
18.60
自引率
2.80%
发文量
122
期刊介绍: The American Economic Review (AER) stands as a prestigious general-interest economics journal. Founded in 1911, it holds the distinction of being one of the nation's oldest and most esteemed scholarly journals in economics. With a commitment to academic excellence, the AER releases 12 issues annually, featuring articles that span a wide spectrum of economic topics.
期刊最新文献
Urban Public Works in Spatial Equilibrium: Experimental Evidence from Ethiopia Household Labor Supply and the Value of Social Security Survivors Benefits Resisting Social Pressure in the Household Using Mobile Money: Experimental Evidence on Microenterprise Investment in Uganda Mental Models and Learning: The Case of Base-Rate Neglect Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1