A. Pollock, P. McGettigan, Rushikesh Mahajan, R. Jeffery, P. Roderick
{"title":"需要一个新的药品法案","authors":"A. Pollock, P. McGettigan, Rushikesh Mahajan, R. Jeffery, P. Roderick","doi":"10.5281/ZENODO.50558","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"After a legislative logjam (since 2011) with respect to regulating the pharmaceuticals industry, the new government at the centre has the opportunity to introduce the much-needed changes to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. The amendment bill, introduced in Parliament on 29 August 2013, aimed to promote rational regulation of safe and effective allopathic drugs. That bill would have been yet another patch on an Act which has already been stretched beyond breaking point. It would have done little to provide a rigorous foundation for putting safety, effectiveness, rationality and need at the heart of the country’s drug regulatory system. It is to be hoped that the government will make a complete overhaul of the Act one of its highest priorities. 1 Background Following the scathing criticisms in 2012 of a parliamentary committee (59th r eport),1 India’s central drugs regulator, the Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO) headed by the Drugs Controller General of India (DCGI),2 was threatened with abolition and replacement by a central drugs authority (CDA), in the Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Bill introduced in Parliament on 29 August 2013.3 The CDSCO was criticised in the 59th report for its pro-industry mission to “meet the aspirations...demands and requirements of the pharmaceutical industry”; for its apparently close cooperation with pharmaceutical companies in easing drug approvals and in avoiding legal requirements; for approving drugs without clinical trials, especially on Indian subjects; and for not exercising statutory powers to require licence revocation or drug bans. The committee also stated that “a very large number” of fi xed dose combination (FDC) drugs – formulations comprising two or more drugs combined in a fi xed ratio of doses and available in a single dosage form – had been approved by state regulatory authorities without prior central approval. FDCs are a peculiar feature of the Indian pharmaceutical market, compared to those on sale in England, the US or Australia.4 The Drugs Act of 1940 emerged from the Chopra Commission Report of 1931, on the need for central drug control legis lation with a view to securing uniformity throughout the country to control the import, manufacture and sale of drugs. It remains the core primary legislation regulating drugs in India today.5 It divided responsibilities between the central government (responsible for import) and the provinces or (today) states (responsible for manufacture, distribution and sale). Many amendments to the Act and the Rules have been introduced, o ften increasing central control.6 In 1952, the Rules introduced the concept of a “new drug”, requiring applicants to have the written permission of the central licensing authority prior to import.7 In June 1961 the Rules were further amended to prohibit the manufacture of a new drug unless it had been previously approved by the central regulator;8 to require the manufacturer of a new drug when applying for that approval to produce all documentary and other evidence relating to its standards of quality, purity and strength “and such other information as may be required including the results of therapeutic trials carried out with it”; and to require applicants for manufacturing licences to produce evidence to the state regulator that the new drug had already been approved.9 These provisions were amongst the fi rst which gave the central government increased control in relation to manufacturing; others included the powers of the central government to give directions to the states (1960);10 and to regulate, restrict and/or prohibit drugs on specifi ed grounds in the public interest (1982 and 2008).11 Nonetheless, several lacunae remain: (a) The need for a pre-approval duty on the regulator to be satisfi ed of the safety, effi cacy and effectiveness of new drugs; (b) The requirement for accountability and transparency in the submission of clinical trial results and data; and (c) The need to address the particular challenges posed by drugs supplied in fi xed dose combinations. We address these issues and then turn to an analysis of the proposed Act in the light of these requirements.","PeriodicalId":53574,"journal":{"name":"Economic and Political Weekly","volume":"97 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Need for a New Drugs Bill\",\"authors\":\"A. Pollock, P. McGettigan, Rushikesh Mahajan, R. Jeffery, P. Roderick\",\"doi\":\"10.5281/ZENODO.50558\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"After a legislative logjam (since 2011) with respect to regulating the pharmaceuticals industry, the new government at the centre has the opportunity to introduce the much-needed changes to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. The amendment bill, introduced in Parliament on 29 August 2013, aimed to promote rational regulation of safe and effective allopathic drugs. That bill would have been yet another patch on an Act which has already been stretched beyond breaking point. It would have done little to provide a rigorous foundation for putting safety, effectiveness, rationality and need at the heart of the country’s drug regulatory system. It is to be hoped that the government will make a complete overhaul of the Act one of its highest priorities. 1 Background Following the scathing criticisms in 2012 of a parliamentary committee (59th r eport),1 India’s central drugs regulator, the Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO) headed by the Drugs Controller General of India (DCGI),2 was threatened with abolition and replacement by a central drugs authority (CDA), in the Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Bill introduced in Parliament on 29 August 2013.3 The CDSCO was criticised in the 59th report for its pro-industry mission to “meet the aspirations...demands and requirements of the pharmaceutical industry”; for its apparently close cooperation with pharmaceutical companies in easing drug approvals and in avoiding legal requirements; for approving drugs without clinical trials, especially on Indian subjects; and for not exercising statutory powers to require licence revocation or drug bans. The committee also stated that “a very large number” of fi xed dose combination (FDC) drugs – formulations comprising two or more drugs combined in a fi xed ratio of doses and available in a single dosage form – had been approved by state regulatory authorities without prior central approval. FDCs are a peculiar feature of the Indian pharmaceutical market, compared to those on sale in England, the US or Australia.4 The Drugs Act of 1940 emerged from the Chopra Commission Report of 1931, on the need for central drug control legis lation with a view to securing uniformity throughout the country to control the import, manufacture and sale of drugs. It remains the core primary legislation regulating drugs in India today.5 It divided responsibilities between the central government (responsible for import) and the provinces or (today) states (responsible for manufacture, distribution and sale). Many amendments to the Act and the Rules have been introduced, o ften increasing central control.6 In 1952, the Rules introduced the concept of a “new drug”, requiring applicants to have the written permission of the central licensing authority prior to import.7 In June 1961 the Rules were further amended to prohibit the manufacture of a new drug unless it had been previously approved by the central regulator;8 to require the manufacturer of a new drug when applying for that approval to produce all documentary and other evidence relating to its standards of quality, purity and strength “and such other information as may be required including the results of therapeutic trials carried out with it”; and to require applicants for manufacturing licences to produce evidence to the state regulator that the new drug had already been approved.9 These provisions were amongst the fi rst which gave the central government increased control in relation to manufacturing; others included the powers of the central government to give directions to the states (1960);10 and to regulate, restrict and/or prohibit drugs on specifi ed grounds in the public interest (1982 and 2008).11 Nonetheless, several lacunae remain: (a) The need for a pre-approval duty on the regulator to be satisfi ed of the safety, effi cacy and effectiveness of new drugs; (b) The requirement for accountability and transparency in the submission of clinical trial results and data; and (c) The need to address the particular challenges posed by drugs supplied in fi xed dose combinations. 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引用次数: 1
摘要
在监管制药业的立法僵局(自2011年以来)之后,处于中心的新政府有机会对《药品和化妆品法》(Drugs and Cosmetics Act)进行急需的修改。2013年8月29日在议会提出的修正法案旨在促进对安全有效的对抗疗法药物的合理监管。该法案将是对一项已经超出临界点的法案的又一个修补。它几乎无法为将安全性、有效性、合理性和需求置于国家药品监管体系的核心提供一个严格的基础。人们希望政府将彻底修改该法案作为其最高优先事项之一。在2012年议会委员会(第59次报告)的严厉批评之后,1印度的中央药品监管机构,由印度药品监督总局(DCGI)领导的中央药品标准控制组织(CDSCO),2受到废除和由中央药品管理局(CDA)取代的威胁。在2013年8月29日议会提出的药品和化妆品(修正案)法案中,CDSCO在第59份报告中因其亲行业使命“满足制药行业的愿望……需求和要求”而受到批评;因为它显然与制药公司密切合作,放宽药品审批,避免法律要求;批准未经临床试验的药物,尤其是针对印度受试者的药物;以及没有行使法定权力要求吊销执照或禁止使用毒品。该委员会还指出,“非常大量”的固定剂量组合(FDC)药物——由两种或两种以上药物以固定剂量比例组合并以单一剂型提供的制剂——已经由国家监管机构批准,而无需事先获得中央批准。与英国、美国或澳大利亚销售的药品相比,fdc是印度药品市场的一个独特特征。1940年的《药品法》源于1931年的乔普拉委员会报告,该报告认为需要制定中央药品管制立法,以确保全国统一控制药品的进口、制造和销售。它仍然是今天印度监管药物的核心主要立法它将责任划分为中央政府(负责进口)和各省或(今天的)州(负责制造、分销和销售)。对《法令》和《规则》进行了许多修订,往往加强了中央控制1952年,《规则》引入了“新药”的概念,要求申请人在进口前获得中央许可机构的书面许可1961年6月,《规则》进一步修订,禁止生产未经中央监管机构批准的新药;8要求新药制造商在申请批准时提供有关其质量、纯度和强度标准的所有文件和其他证据,“以及可能需要的其他信息,包括使用该药物进行的治疗试验的结果”;并要求生产许可证的申请人向国家监管机构出示新药已获批准的证据这些条款是第一批赋予中央政府对制造业加强控制的条款;其他包括中央政府向各州下达指示的权力(1960年);以及基于公共利益的特定理由对药物进行管制、限制和/或禁止的权力(1982年和2008年)尽管如此,仍然存在一些空白:(a)需要对监管机构规定预先批准的责任,以满足新药的安全性、有效性和有效性;(b)在提交临床试验结果和数据时要求问责制和透明度;(c)需要解决以固定剂量组合供应的药物所带来的特殊挑战。我们处理这些问题,然后根据这些要求对拟议的法案进行分析。
After a legislative logjam (since 2011) with respect to regulating the pharmaceuticals industry, the new government at the centre has the opportunity to introduce the much-needed changes to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. The amendment bill, introduced in Parliament on 29 August 2013, aimed to promote rational regulation of safe and effective allopathic drugs. That bill would have been yet another patch on an Act which has already been stretched beyond breaking point. It would have done little to provide a rigorous foundation for putting safety, effectiveness, rationality and need at the heart of the country’s drug regulatory system. It is to be hoped that the government will make a complete overhaul of the Act one of its highest priorities. 1 Background Following the scathing criticisms in 2012 of a parliamentary committee (59th r eport),1 India’s central drugs regulator, the Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO) headed by the Drugs Controller General of India (DCGI),2 was threatened with abolition and replacement by a central drugs authority (CDA), in the Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Bill introduced in Parliament on 29 August 2013.3 The CDSCO was criticised in the 59th report for its pro-industry mission to “meet the aspirations...demands and requirements of the pharmaceutical industry”; for its apparently close cooperation with pharmaceutical companies in easing drug approvals and in avoiding legal requirements; for approving drugs without clinical trials, especially on Indian subjects; and for not exercising statutory powers to require licence revocation or drug bans. The committee also stated that “a very large number” of fi xed dose combination (FDC) drugs – formulations comprising two or more drugs combined in a fi xed ratio of doses and available in a single dosage form – had been approved by state regulatory authorities without prior central approval. FDCs are a peculiar feature of the Indian pharmaceutical market, compared to those on sale in England, the US or Australia.4 The Drugs Act of 1940 emerged from the Chopra Commission Report of 1931, on the need for central drug control legis lation with a view to securing uniformity throughout the country to control the import, manufacture and sale of drugs. It remains the core primary legislation regulating drugs in India today.5 It divided responsibilities between the central government (responsible for import) and the provinces or (today) states (responsible for manufacture, distribution and sale). Many amendments to the Act and the Rules have been introduced, o ften increasing central control.6 In 1952, the Rules introduced the concept of a “new drug”, requiring applicants to have the written permission of the central licensing authority prior to import.7 In June 1961 the Rules were further amended to prohibit the manufacture of a new drug unless it had been previously approved by the central regulator;8 to require the manufacturer of a new drug when applying for that approval to produce all documentary and other evidence relating to its standards of quality, purity and strength “and such other information as may be required including the results of therapeutic trials carried out with it”; and to require applicants for manufacturing licences to produce evidence to the state regulator that the new drug had already been approved.9 These provisions were amongst the fi rst which gave the central government increased control in relation to manufacturing; others included the powers of the central government to give directions to the states (1960);10 and to regulate, restrict and/or prohibit drugs on specifi ed grounds in the public interest (1982 and 2008).11 Nonetheless, several lacunae remain: (a) The need for a pre-approval duty on the regulator to be satisfi ed of the safety, effi cacy and effectiveness of new drugs; (b) The requirement for accountability and transparency in the submission of clinical trial results and data; and (c) The need to address the particular challenges posed by drugs supplied in fi xed dose combinations. We address these issues and then turn to an analysis of the proposed Act in the light of these requirements.
期刊介绍:
The Economic and Political Weekly, published from Mumbai, is an Indian institution which enjoys a global reputation for excellence in independent scholarship and critical inquiry. First published in 1949 as the Economic Weekly and since 1966 as the Economic and Political Weekly, EPW, as the journal is popularly known, occupies a special place in the intellectual history of independent India. For more than five decades EPW has remained a unique forum that week after week has brought together academics, researchers, policy makers, independent thinkers, members of non-governmental organisations and political activists for debates straddling economics, politics, sociology, culture, the environment and numerous other disciplines.