资本市场的风险分配:信用违约掉期、保险和分界理论

IF 0.4 Q3 LAW Connecticut Insurance Law Journal Pub Date : 2007-06-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3677277
R. Schwartz
{"title":"资本市场的风险分配:信用违约掉期、保险和分界理论","authors":"R. Schwartz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3677277","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Goldman [Sachs] should matter to outsiders . . . because it stands at the centre of a two-decade-long transformation of the financial markets and a new approach to risk. Business risks that were once seen as a lumpy fact of life are now routinely sliced up and packaged into combinations that generally suit issuers and investors alike. At the heart of this change has been the development of huge markets in swaps, derivatives and other complex and often opaque instruments that allow the transfer of risk from one party to another. From small beginnings in 1987, the face value of contracts in interest-rate and currency derivatives is now more than $200 trillion[,] 16 times America's GDP. A further $17 trillion is outstanding in (even newer) credit-default swaps, which allow bond investors to lay off the risk of issuers defaulting. I. INTRODUCTION Heralded as the \"debutante of the suretyship world (pure as the wind-driven snow and virtually unsullied by the foul touch of litigation),\" credit default swaps (CDS) have transformed banking.2 Lenders who once found themselves stuck with bundles of indivisible, illiquid risks can now carve out and hedge credit exposure to individual borrowers. And they do it on a massive scale. As last reported by FitchRatings, the notional amount of outstanding CDS stood at $3.5 trillion, representing two-thirds of the entire credit derivatives market and an 86% increase from the prior year's total of $2.8 trillion.3 Yet despite such rapid growth, use of credit derivatives was too small to be either noticed or recorded at any significant levels in 1996.4 As one would expect of a market that has gone from cradle to world phenomenon in less than a decade, CDS have attracted both supporters and detractors. Proponents extol the ability of CDS to spread risk and increase liquidity across credit markets, allowing participants to actively manage and protect credit portfolios.5 Sensational critics warn that a spike in interest rates could trigger a \"derivatives tsunami\" that would bring all of the major banks to their knees and cause a \"blowup\" in world credit markets.6 Experience in the past few years has shown that, if used responsibly, CDS have the ability to yield all of the promised benefits with few-if any-of the predicted catastrophes.7 Between the disparagers and the defenders of CDS stand the regulators. But who are the regulators of CDS markets, and what law applies? Since CDS are traded entirely over-the-counter (OTC), one could argue that the true regulators are market participants themselves. Banded together as members of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), derivatives markets participants have created a system of documenting and amending trade relationships that is both flexible and robust. Most members of ISDA are banks or groups of banks. Some outside regulators, however, worry that CDS markets are growing too quickly for any bank or group of banks to control.8 In judging who has authority to step in and govern various aspects of CDS trading, one confronts a crowd of would-be regulators. The CFTC, SEC, Fed, state insurance regulators, and both state and federal courts all have spheres of competence that, depending on circumstances, may or may not affect CDS trading. Letters of guarantee and other analogous surety instruments require their users to focus on merely one body of statutory law-e.g., Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code-and its applicable case precedents; CDS, on the other hand, demand that their users at least take account of (and perhaps apply) commodities, securities, banking, and insurance regulation, as well as all applicable case law. Where commodities regulation is concerned, CDS enjoy a blanket exemption under the Commodities Exchange Act.9 The Commodities Exchange Act (the \"Act\") includes in its definition of \"excluded commodity\" any \"credit risk or measure.\"10 Building on this definition in a section on \"excluded derivative transactions,\" the Act notes that its terms do not apply to any agreement in an excluded commodity where such agreements are executed between eligible participants-financial institutions, regulated insurance companies, and most investment companies-off of a registered exchange. …","PeriodicalId":29865,"journal":{"name":"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal","volume":"2677 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2007-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"20","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation\",\"authors\":\"R. Schwartz\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3677277\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Goldman [Sachs] should matter to outsiders . . . because it stands at the centre of a two-decade-long transformation of the financial markets and a new approach to risk. Business risks that were once seen as a lumpy fact of life are now routinely sliced up and packaged into combinations that generally suit issuers and investors alike. At the heart of this change has been the development of huge markets in swaps, derivatives and other complex and often opaque instruments that allow the transfer of risk from one party to another. From small beginnings in 1987, the face value of contracts in interest-rate and currency derivatives is now more than $200 trillion[,] 16 times America's GDP. A further $17 trillion is outstanding in (even newer) credit-default swaps, which allow bond investors to lay off the risk of issuers defaulting. I. INTRODUCTION Heralded as the \\\"debutante of the suretyship world (pure as the wind-driven snow and virtually unsullied by the foul touch of litigation),\\\" credit default swaps (CDS) have transformed banking.2 Lenders who once found themselves stuck with bundles of indivisible, illiquid risks can now carve out and hedge credit exposure to individual borrowers. And they do it on a massive scale. As last reported by FitchRatings, the notional amount of outstanding CDS stood at $3.5 trillion, representing two-thirds of the entire credit derivatives market and an 86% increase from the prior year's total of $2.8 trillion.3 Yet despite such rapid growth, use of credit derivatives was too small to be either noticed or recorded at any significant levels in 1996.4 As one would expect of a market that has gone from cradle to world phenomenon in less than a decade, CDS have attracted both supporters and detractors. Proponents extol the ability of CDS to spread risk and increase liquidity across credit markets, allowing participants to actively manage and protect credit portfolios.5 Sensational critics warn that a spike in interest rates could trigger a \\\"derivatives tsunami\\\" that would bring all of the major banks to their knees and cause a \\\"blowup\\\" in world credit markets.6 Experience in the past few years has shown that, if used responsibly, CDS have the ability to yield all of the promised benefits with few-if any-of the predicted catastrophes.7 Between the disparagers and the defenders of CDS stand the regulators. But who are the regulators of CDS markets, and what law applies? Since CDS are traded entirely over-the-counter (OTC), one could argue that the true regulators are market participants themselves. Banded together as members of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), derivatives markets participants have created a system of documenting and amending trade relationships that is both flexible and robust. Most members of ISDA are banks or groups of banks. Some outside regulators, however, worry that CDS markets are growing too quickly for any bank or group of banks to control.8 In judging who has authority to step in and govern various aspects of CDS trading, one confronts a crowd of would-be regulators. The CFTC, SEC, Fed, state insurance regulators, and both state and federal courts all have spheres of competence that, depending on circumstances, may or may not affect CDS trading. Letters of guarantee and other analogous surety instruments require their users to focus on merely one body of statutory law-e.g., Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code-and its applicable case precedents; CDS, on the other hand, demand that their users at least take account of (and perhaps apply) commodities, securities, banking, and insurance regulation, as well as all applicable case law. Where commodities regulation is concerned, CDS enjoy a blanket exemption under the Commodities Exchange Act.9 The Commodities Exchange Act (the \\\"Act\\\") includes in its definition of \\\"excluded commodity\\\" any \\\"credit risk or measure.\\\"10 Building on this definition in a section on \\\"excluded derivative transactions,\\\" the Act notes that its terms do not apply to any agreement in an excluded commodity where such agreements are executed between eligible participants-financial institutions, regulated insurance companies, and most investment companies-off of a registered exchange. …\",\"PeriodicalId\":29865,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal\",\"volume\":\"2677 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2007-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"20\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3677277\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Connecticut Insurance Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3677277","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 20

摘要

高盛(Sachs)对外人来说应该很重要……因为它处于长达20年的金融市场转型和一种新的风险管理方法的中心。曾经被视为不稳定的生活事实的商业风险,现在经常被分割和打包成通常适合发行人和投资者的组合。这一变化的核心是巨大的掉期、衍生品和其他复杂且往往不透明的工具市场的发展,这些工具允许风险从一方转移到另一方。从1987年开始,利率和货币衍生品合约的面值现在已经超过200万亿美元,是美国GDP的16倍。另外还有17万亿美元的信用违约掉期(甚至是更新的)未清偿,这使得债券投资者可以规避发行者违约的风险。信用违约掉期(CDS)被誉为“担保界的初次亮相者(像风吹的雪一样纯洁,几乎没有被诉讼的污秽所玷污)”,它已经改变了银行业曾经发现自己受困于大量不可分割的非流动性风险的银行,现在可以对单个借款人的信贷敞口进行分割和对冲。而且规模很大。根据FitchRatings的最新报告,未偿还CDS的名义金额为3.5万亿美元,占整个信用衍生品市场的三分之二,比前一年的2.8万亿美元总额增长了86%然而,尽管信用衍生品的增长如此之快,但在1996年,信用衍生品的使用规模太小,没有被注意到,也没有被记录到任何显著的水平。正如人们对一个在不到十年的时间里从摇篮到世界现象的市场所期望的那样,CDS吸引了支持者和批评者。支持者称赞CDS在信贷市场上分散风险和增加流动性的能力,使参与者能够积极管理和保护信贷组合耸人听闻的批评家警告说,利率的飙升可能引发一场“衍生品海啸”,使所有的大银行陷入困境,并导致世界信贷市场的“爆炸”过去几年的经验表明,如果使用得当,CDS有能力产生所有承诺的好处,而很少(如果有的话)预测的灾难在CDS的诋毁者和捍卫者之间站着监管机构。但谁是CDS市场的监管者,适用什么法律?由于CDS完全是在场外交易(OTC),有人可能会说,真正的监管者是市场参与者自己。作为国际掉期和衍生品协会(ISDA)的成员,衍生品市场参与者已经创建了一个记录和修改交易关系的系统,该系统既灵活又稳健。ISDA的大多数成员是银行或银行集团。然而,一些外部监管机构担心,CDS市场增长过快,任何一家银行或银行集团都无法控制在判断谁有权介入并管理CDS交易的各个方面时,人们面对的是一群准监管者。CFTC、SEC、美联储、州保险监管机构以及州和联邦法院都有各自的职权范围,视情况而定,可能会或可能不会影响CDS交易。担保书和其他类似的保证文书要求其使用者只关注一项成文法,例如:《统一商法典》第五条及其适用的判例;另一方面,CDS要求它们的用户至少考虑(也许适用)商品、证券、银行和保险法规,以及所有适用的判例法。在商品监管方面,根据《商品交易法》,CDS享有全面豁免。《商品交易法》(“法案”)在其“被排除的商品”的定义中包括任何“信用风险或措施”。在“被排除的衍生品交易”一节的定义基础上,该法案指出,其条款不适用于被排除商品的任何协议,如果此类协议是在注册交易所以外的合格参与者(金融机构、受监管的保险公司和大多数投资公司)之间执行的。…
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation
Goldman [Sachs] should matter to outsiders . . . because it stands at the centre of a two-decade-long transformation of the financial markets and a new approach to risk. Business risks that were once seen as a lumpy fact of life are now routinely sliced up and packaged into combinations that generally suit issuers and investors alike. At the heart of this change has been the development of huge markets in swaps, derivatives and other complex and often opaque instruments that allow the transfer of risk from one party to another. From small beginnings in 1987, the face value of contracts in interest-rate and currency derivatives is now more than $200 trillion[,] 16 times America's GDP. A further $17 trillion is outstanding in (even newer) credit-default swaps, which allow bond investors to lay off the risk of issuers defaulting. I. INTRODUCTION Heralded as the "debutante of the suretyship world (pure as the wind-driven snow and virtually unsullied by the foul touch of litigation)," credit default swaps (CDS) have transformed banking.2 Lenders who once found themselves stuck with bundles of indivisible, illiquid risks can now carve out and hedge credit exposure to individual borrowers. And they do it on a massive scale. As last reported by FitchRatings, the notional amount of outstanding CDS stood at $3.5 trillion, representing two-thirds of the entire credit derivatives market and an 86% increase from the prior year's total of $2.8 trillion.3 Yet despite such rapid growth, use of credit derivatives was too small to be either noticed or recorded at any significant levels in 1996.4 As one would expect of a market that has gone from cradle to world phenomenon in less than a decade, CDS have attracted both supporters and detractors. Proponents extol the ability of CDS to spread risk and increase liquidity across credit markets, allowing participants to actively manage and protect credit portfolios.5 Sensational critics warn that a spike in interest rates could trigger a "derivatives tsunami" that would bring all of the major banks to their knees and cause a "blowup" in world credit markets.6 Experience in the past few years has shown that, if used responsibly, CDS have the ability to yield all of the promised benefits with few-if any-of the predicted catastrophes.7 Between the disparagers and the defenders of CDS stand the regulators. But who are the regulators of CDS markets, and what law applies? Since CDS are traded entirely over-the-counter (OTC), one could argue that the true regulators are market participants themselves. Banded together as members of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), derivatives markets participants have created a system of documenting and amending trade relationships that is both flexible and robust. Most members of ISDA are banks or groups of banks. Some outside regulators, however, worry that CDS markets are growing too quickly for any bank or group of banks to control.8 In judging who has authority to step in and govern various aspects of CDS trading, one confronts a crowd of would-be regulators. The CFTC, SEC, Fed, state insurance regulators, and both state and federal courts all have spheres of competence that, depending on circumstances, may or may not affect CDS trading. Letters of guarantee and other analogous surety instruments require their users to focus on merely one body of statutory law-e.g., Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code-and its applicable case precedents; CDS, on the other hand, demand that their users at least take account of (and perhaps apply) commodities, securities, banking, and insurance regulation, as well as all applicable case law. Where commodities regulation is concerned, CDS enjoy a blanket exemption under the Commodities Exchange Act.9 The Commodities Exchange Act (the "Act") includes in its definition of "excluded commodity" any "credit risk or measure."10 Building on this definition in a section on "excluded derivative transactions," the Act notes that its terms do not apply to any agreement in an excluded commodity where such agreements are executed between eligible participants-financial institutions, regulated insurance companies, and most investment companies-off of a registered exchange. …
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Demand for Health Insurance in the Time of COVID-19: Evidence from the Special Enrollment Period in the Washington State ACA Marketplace Licensing the Insured: Providing Driver Licenses to Unauthorized Immigrants Has Not Impacted Auto Insurance in California Terrorism Risk Insurance Act: Time to Renew . . . or Rethink? Loss of ‘Unattended Property in a Public Place’ – Testing the Good Faith of the Travel Insurer The Insurance Business in Transition to the Physical-Cyber Market: Communication, Coordination and Harmonization of Cyber Risk Coverages
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1