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引用次数: 281

摘要

我们发展了一个理论,表明通过库存交易向贷款人传达公司的基本质量(例如,其运营能力)比通过贷款请求传递信息更有效——它导致成本更低的运营扭曲,我们描述了效率的提高如何依赖于公司的运营特征,如运营成本、市场规模和库存残值。只有当库存交易以足够低的成本可验证时,通过库存发出的信号才成立,然后我们将注意力转向如何在实践中实现这种可验证性,并认为区块链技术可以比传统的监控机制更有效地实现它。为了证明这一点,我们开发了b_verify,这是一个开源的区块链协议,利用比特币以经济有效的方式提供大规模的供应链透明度。本文确定了采用区块链的一个重要好处——通过打开公司供应链的透明窗口,区块链技术提供了以较低的信号成本获得有利融资条件的能力。此外,对首选信号模式的分析揭示了哪种类型的公司或供应链将从区块链技术的使用中受益最大。本文被运营管理维克多Martínez-de-Albéniz接受。
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On the Financing Benefits of Supply Chain Transparency and Blockchain Adoption
We develop a theory that shows signaling a firm’s fundamental quality (e.g., its operational capabilities) to lenders through inventory transactions to be more efficient—it leads to less costly operational distortions—than signaling through loan requests, and we characterize how the efficiency gains depend on firm operational characteristics, such as operating costs, market size, and inventory salvage value. Signaling through inventory being only tenable when inventory transactions are verifiable at low enough cost, we then turn our attention to how this verifiability can be achieved in practice and argue that blockchain technology could enable it more efficiently than traditional monitoring mechanisms. To demonstrate, we develop b_verify, an open-source blockchain protocol that leverages Bitcoin to provide supply chain transparency at scale and in a cost-effective way. The paper identifies an important benefit of blockchain adoption—by opening a window of transparency into a firm’s supply chain, blockchain technology furnishes the ability to secure favorable financing terms at lower signaling costs. Furthermore, the analysis of the preferred signaling mode sheds light on what types of firms or supply chains would stand to benefit the most from this use of blockchain technology. This paper was accepted by Victor Martínez-de-Albéniz, operations management.
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