通过玷污企业声誉来实施经济制裁

IF 1.4 3区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Business and Politics Pub Date : 2023-09-08 DOI:10.1017/bap.2023.22
Keith A. Preble, B. Early
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引用次数: 1

摘要

实施制裁的最佳策略是什么?美国外国资产控制办公室(OFAC)等制裁执行机构在惩罚违反制裁的国内公司时面临资源限制和政治约束。除了罚款之外,制裁执行行动还有“点名羞辱”的作用,损害了违规者的声誉。规模较大、知名度较高的公司往往比规模较小或知名度较低的公司在声誉方面面临更大的风险。与此同时,惩罚违反制裁的知名企业,可能会让公众更多地认识到不遵守制裁的风险和潜在后果。我们的理论是,OFAC应该对知名公司施加更大的罚款,以引起人们对这些案件的关注,使执法行动更令人难忘,并提高他们造成的声誉成本。我们对2010年至2021年OFAC的执法行动进行了统计分析,并为我们的理论找到了支持。
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Enforcing economic sanctions by tarnishing corporate reputations
What strategies work best for enforcing sanctions? Sanctions enforcement agencies like the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) face resource limitations and political constraints in punishing domestic firms for violating sanctions. Beyond monetary fines, sanctions enforcement actions also serve a “naming and shaming” function that tarnishes violators’ reputations. Larger, higher-profile companies tend have much more at stake in terms of their reputations than smaller or less well-known firms. At the same time, punishing higher-profile companies for sanctions violations is likely to generate more publicity about the risks and potential consequences of not complying with sanctions. We theorize that OFAC should impose larger fines on high-profile companies to draw attention to those cases, make the enforcement actions more memorable, and enhance the reputational costs that they inflict. We conduct a statistical analysis of OFAC enforcement actions from 2010 to 2021 and find support for our theory.
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来源期刊
Business and Politics
Business and Politics Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
3.60
自引率
16.70%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: Business and Politics solicits articles within the broad area of the interaction between firms and political actors. Two specific areas are of particular interest to the journal. The first concerns the use of non-market corporate strategy. These efforts include internal organizational design decisions as well as external strategies. Internal organizational design refers to management structure, sourcing decisions, and transnational organization with respect to the firm"s non-market environment. External strategies include legal tactics, testimony, lobbying and other means to influence policy makers at all levels of government and international institutions as an adjunct to market strategies of the firm.
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