非专业投资者对PCAOB对标准审计报告修改建议的反应

Brian Carver, Brad S. Trinkle
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引用次数: 42

摘要

为了提高标准审计报告的信息价值,美国上市公司会计监督委员会(PCAOB)提出了一项新的审计标准,要求审计师在审计报告主体中报告关键审计事项(CAMs)。该建议得到了投资者团体的批准,但财务报表编制者表示,新的披露可能会对审计质量和审计报告的信息内容产生负面影响。本研究探讨建议的准则如何影响经验丰富的非专业投资者对审计报告可读性的看法、他们的估值判断以及他们对管理层可信度的评价。我们发现,CAM的披露会对审计报告的可读性产生负面影响,但不会直接或通过其对可读性的影响来逐步影响投资者的估值判断。相反,投资者在做出估值判断时关注的是收益基准表现。然而,当收益刚刚达到预期时,披露CAM确实会降低投资者对管理层可信度的看法。我们的研究结果表明,PCAOB提出的准则将对审计报告的可读性产生显著的负面影响,但对投资者审计报告的信息内容的影响有限。
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Nonprofessional Investors’ Reactions to the PCAOB's Proposed Changes to the Standard Audit Report
As part of its efforts to improve the informational value of the standard audit report, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) proposed a new auditing standard that would require the auditor to report critical audit matters (CAMs) in the body of the audit report. The proposal met with approval from investor groups, while preparers have suggested the new disclosures could negatively affect the quality of the audit and the informational content of the audit report. This study examines how the proposed standard influences experienced, nonprofessional investors’ perception of the readability of the audit report, their valuation judgments, and their evaluations of management’s credibility. We find that the disclosure of a CAM negatively impacts the readability of the audit report, but does not, either directly or through its effect on readability, incrementally inform investors’ valuation judgments. Instead, investors focused on earnings benchmark performance when making valuation judgements. The disclosure of a CAM does, however, lower investors’ perceptions of management’s credibility when earnings just meet expectations. Our results suggest that the PCAOB’s proposed standard will have a significant, negative effect on the readability of the audit report but only a limited impact on the informational content of the audit report for investors.
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