证券欺诈诉讼中的集体冲突

R. Booth
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When the truth comes out, stock price declines, and those who bought during the fraud period sue the corporation for damages equal to the difference between the price they paid and the price at which the stock finally settles. Only buyers have standing to sue in such circumstances. Mere holders have no claim.The problem is that most buyers are also holders. Most investors are well diversified. More than two-thirds of all stock is held through mutual funds, pension plans, and other institutional investors, who trade mostly for purposes of portfolio balancing. As a result, most of the buyers in the plaintiff class will also be holders as to more shares than the number of shares bought during the fraud period. Because the defendant corporation pays any settlement – further reducing the value of the corporation and its stock price through what I call feedback damages – most of the plaintiff class will lose more as holders than they gain as buyers. Thus, many members of the plaintiff class would prefer that the action be dismissed. It is therefore impossible for anyone to be an adequate representative of a class composed of both members who support the action and members who oppose the action. Even if a court would permit a plaintiff class to be gerrymandered to include only those buyers who would gain more than they lose, there is no practical way to identify such investors.In addition, it is likely that in most meritorious securities fraud actions, part of the decrease in stock price will come from expenses associated with defending and settling the securities fraud claim and from harm to the reputation of the defendant company resulting in an increase in its cost of capital. But these claims are derivative rather than direct. Accordingly, it is the corporation – and not individual buyers – who should recover for this portion of the damages. Aside from the fact that such claims are derivative in nature and presumably must be litigated as such, a derivative action is clearly superior to a class action because recovery by the corporation from individual wrongdoers – rather than payment by the corporation to buyers – eliminates feedback damages and thus reduces the size of the aggregate claim. Moreover, a derivative action is much more efficient in that there is a single plaintiff – the corporation – rather than hundreds or thousands of individual buyers. Finally, policy considerations also militate against certification. Diversified investors are hedged against securities fraud by virtue of being diversified and have no need for a remedy. A diversified investor is just as likely to sell a fraud-affected stock as to buy one. It all comes out in the wash. Thus, the expenses associated with securities fraud class actions are a deadweight loss that serves only to reduce investor return. 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引用次数: 1

摘要

虽然证券欺诈集体诉讼是一个完善的法律制度,但实际上很少(如果有的话)此类诉讼符合《联邦民事诉讼规则》第23条关于集体诉讼认证的要求。除其他事项外,规则23要求法院认定原告代表将公平和充分地保护集体利益,集体诉讼优于其他解决纠纷的手段。在典型的证券欺诈案中,原告群体由在被告公司有应公开披露的负面重大信息时购买标的股票的投资者组成。一旦真相大白,股价就会下跌,在欺诈期间购买股票的人就会向公司提出诉讼,要求赔偿支付价格与最终收盘价之间的差额。在这种情况下,只有买方才有资格起诉。持股人没有权利要求。问题是,大多数买家同时也是持有者。大多数投资者都很善于分散投资。超过三分之二的股票是通过共同基金、养老金计划和其他机构投资者持有的,他们交易的主要目的是平衡投资组合。因此,原告类别中的大多数买家也将是股东,因为在欺诈期间购买的股票数量超过了股票数量。因为被告公司支付任何和解费用——通过我称之为反馈损害赔偿的方式进一步降低公司价值及其股票价格——大多数原告作为股东的损失将大于作为买家的收益。因此,原告集体的许多成员希望诉讼被驳回。因此,任何一个人都不可能成为一个既支持这种行动又反对这种行动的阶级的充分代表。即使法院允许不公正地划分原告群体,只包括那些得不偿失的买家,也没有切实可行的方法来识别这样的投资者。此外,在大多数值得称道的证券欺诈诉讼中,股价下跌的部分原因可能是与辩护和解决证券欺诈索赔有关的费用,以及被告公司声誉受到损害导致其资金成本增加。但这些主张是派生的,而不是直接的。因此,应该赔偿这部分损失的是公司,而不是个人买家。除了这类索赔在本质上是派生的,而且可能必须就此提起诉讼这一事实之外,派生诉讼显然优于集体诉讼,因为由公司向个别违法者追偿——而不是由公司向买方付款——消除了反馈损害,从而减少了总索赔的规模。此外,派生诉讼的效率要高得多,因为原告只有一个——公司——而不是成百上千的个人买家。最后,政策方面的考虑也不利于认证。多元化的投资者由于多元化而避免了证券欺诈,不需要补救。一个多元化的投资者卖出受欺诈影响的股票的可能性和买入股票的可能性是一样的。一切都是水落石出。因此,与证券欺诈集体诉讼相关的费用是一种无谓损失,只会减少投资者的回报。因为绝大多数投资者都是多元化的——而且因为大多数投资者不多元化是不理性的——多元化投资者的利益应该高于任何倾向于集体诉讼救济的单一投资者的利益。此外,集体诉讼构成了过度的威慑,而衍生诉讼提供的回应与投资者所遭受的真正伤害成正比。由于衍生品诉讼的前景,多元化投资者完全免受任何真正损失的影响,这也为证券欺诈提供了有效的威慑。简而言之,当面临将证券欺诈行为认定为集体诉讼的动议时,法院通常应将该诉讼视为派生诉讼并进行相应的诉讼。需要明确的是,这种做法将有效地废除证券欺诈集体诉讼,代之以衍生诉讼。但正如这里所展示的,投资者将因此受益。
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Class Conflict in Securities Fraud Litigation
Although securities fraud class actions are a well-established legal institution, few (if any) such actions in fact meet the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for certification as a class action. Among other things, Rule 23 requires the court to find that the representative plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class and that a class action is superior to other means of resolving the dispute.In the typical securities fraud case, the plaintiff class consists of investors who buy the subject stock at a time when the defendant corporation has negative material information that should be publicly disclosed. When the truth comes out, stock price declines, and those who bought during the fraud period sue the corporation for damages equal to the difference between the price they paid and the price at which the stock finally settles. Only buyers have standing to sue in such circumstances. Mere holders have no claim.The problem is that most buyers are also holders. Most investors are well diversified. More than two-thirds of all stock is held through mutual funds, pension plans, and other institutional investors, who trade mostly for purposes of portfolio balancing. As a result, most of the buyers in the plaintiff class will also be holders as to more shares than the number of shares bought during the fraud period. Because the defendant corporation pays any settlement – further reducing the value of the corporation and its stock price through what I call feedback damages – most of the plaintiff class will lose more as holders than they gain as buyers. Thus, many members of the plaintiff class would prefer that the action be dismissed. It is therefore impossible for anyone to be an adequate representative of a class composed of both members who support the action and members who oppose the action. Even if a court would permit a plaintiff class to be gerrymandered to include only those buyers who would gain more than they lose, there is no practical way to identify such investors.In addition, it is likely that in most meritorious securities fraud actions, part of the decrease in stock price will come from expenses associated with defending and settling the securities fraud claim and from harm to the reputation of the defendant company resulting in an increase in its cost of capital. But these claims are derivative rather than direct. Accordingly, it is the corporation – and not individual buyers – who should recover for this portion of the damages. Aside from the fact that such claims are derivative in nature and presumably must be litigated as such, a derivative action is clearly superior to a class action because recovery by the corporation from individual wrongdoers – rather than payment by the corporation to buyers – eliminates feedback damages and thus reduces the size of the aggregate claim. Moreover, a derivative action is much more efficient in that there is a single plaintiff – the corporation – rather than hundreds or thousands of individual buyers. Finally, policy considerations also militate against certification. Diversified investors are hedged against securities fraud by virtue of being diversified and have no need for a remedy. A diversified investor is just as likely to sell a fraud-affected stock as to buy one. It all comes out in the wash. Thus, the expenses associated with securities fraud class actions are a deadweight loss that serves only to reduce investor return. Because the vast majority of investors are diversified – and because it is irrational for most investors not to diversify – the interests of diversified investors should trump those of any undiversified investors who would favor a class action remedy. Moreover, class actions constitute excessive deterrence, whereas derivative actions provide a response that is proportional to the true harm suffered by investors. Diversified investors are completely protected against any true loss by the prospect of derivative litigation, which also provides an effective deterrent against securities fraud.In short, when faced with a motion to certify a securities fraud action as a class action, a court should ordinarily treat the action as derivative and proceed accordingly. To be clear, this approach would effectively abolish securities fraud class actions and replace them with derivative actions. But as demonstrated here, investors would be better off as a result.
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