研发伙伴关系中专利所有权的分配:默认规则与契约实践

3区 文学 Q3 Arts and Humanities SCRIPTORIUM Pub Date : 2018-10-01 DOI:10.2966/SCRIP.170120.4
A. Gorbatyuk
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引用次数: 1

摘要

由于新技术的复杂性增加和技术的快速发展,组织往往不能独立跟上技术进步,并通过建立研发伙伴关系进行开放式创新活动。在这种伙伴关系的谈判中,共同开发的发明的专利所有权的分配是一个困难的问题,由于缺乏对专利立法的监管和协调,可能会产生极大的问题。这就需要咨询可能涉及大规模国际伙伴关系的相当多的法律制度。分配所有权的困难也可能由于非法律原因而产生,例如商业利益分歧。虽然许多专利制度建议将所有权作为一种默认制度,但在实践中,由于进一步共同开发的复杂性,组织往往会避免这种制度。合同自由原则允许组织建立自己的适用规则,管理共同开发的发明的所有权分配和利用。这些规则提供了更大的灵活性,但也意味着在设计合同时需要付出一些交易成本。在本文中,我研究了为什么(2020)17:1脚本4 5某些默认规则不是“粘性的”,以及是否有可能建立一个被大多数谈判方接受的默认规则。
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The Allocation of Patent Ownership in R&D Partnerships: Default Rules v. Contractual Practices
Due to the increased complexity of new technologies and rapid technological developments, organisations often cannot independently keep up with the technological progress and engage in open innovation activities by setting up R&D partnerships. The allocation of patent ownership of jointly developed inventions is a difficult issue during the negotiations of such partnerships and can be extremely problematic due to the lack of regulation and harmonisation of patent legislation. This entails the need to consult a considerable number of legal systems that may be involved in large-scale international partnerships. The difficulties in allocating ownership can also arise due to non-legal reasons, such as diverging business interests. While many patent systems suggest coownership as a default regime, in practice organisations often avoid it due to the complexity related to further joint exploitation. The principle of freedom of contract allows organisations to establish their own applicable rules governing the allocation of ownership and exploitation of jointly developed inventions. Those rules provide more flexibility, but also imply some transaction costs in designing contracts. In this paper I examine why (2020) 17:1 SCRIPTed 4 5 certain default rules are not “sticky” and whether it would be possible to establish a default rule accepted by the majority of the negotiating parties.
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